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SUMMARY 
It is difficult to stabilize or raise the prices of a perish-
able product like hogs by storage programs such as those 
that have been used for durable products like grain and 
cotton. Direct payments to make up the difference be-
tween free-market prices and the "support" level appear 
more promising for this purpose. 
The Canadian government, for example, gave up its 
price-support programs for perishable farm products 
early in 1960 and initiated direct-payment programs in-
stead. The payments for hogs were limited to 100 head of 
grades A and B hogs per producer. 
This report includes estimates of the effects and costs 
of three different kinds of direct· payment programs for 
hogs that might be developed in the United States to at-
tain alternative economic objectives. It draws upon the 
Canadian experience at several points but covers a much 
wider range of alternatives. 
Following a review of the current Canadian direct-
payment program for hogs, the three alternative types of 
direct-payment programs are studied for possible adap-
tation to the nog industry in the United States. They are: 
1. A program that would limit payments to 100 or 
200 hogs per producer. 
2. A program to restrict payments to a national quota 
distributed pro rata among hog producers. 
3. A program to restrict payments to lightweight hogs. 
In the analysis of the first program, Agricultural Cen· 
sus data for 1954 are used to estimate the effects of direct-
payment programs in the United States that would limit 
payments to a uniform maximum number of hogs per 
producer. About 89 percent of the producers in the United 
States would have their entire sales subsidized under a 
program with a 100.hog limit. About 97 percent of the 
producers would have their entire hog sales subsidized if 
payments were limited to 200 hogs per producer. 
Producers outside of the Corn Belt would have the 
best relative position under limited direct-payment pro-
grams. Many of these producers have a relatively small 
volume, and their entire sales would be subsidized. A 
direct-payment program that would limit payments to 
100 hogs per producer would be considerably more re-
strictive on producers in the important hog-producing 
regions where herds generally are larger. 
The cost of a direct-payment program that would have 
provided a $2 per hundredweight direct payment for all 
hogs sold during ] 954, the latest census year for which 
data are available, is estimated at $286,439,532. A pro-
gram that would have limited payments to 100 hogs per 
producer would have cost an estimated $228,573,598, 
about 20 percent less than the program for all hogs. The 
program with a 200-hog limit would have cost an esti-
mated $267,753,861, about 6 percent less than the pro-
gram for all hogs. 
The second program would restrict payments to a 
national hog-marketing quota. National pork consumption 
for 1959 is estimated on the basis of pork supply and dis· 
tribution statistics available at the end of 1957 to simu-
late conditions that would have been encountered if a 
system of quotas had been in force at that time. 
A hypothetical national marketing quota of 74,247,465 
hogs projected for the 1959 marketing year is appor· 
tioned to producers on the basis of their relative market· 
ings during a base period of 1954,-57. As an alternative 
basis for allocation, the 1954 .. 57 base is adjusted for reg-
ional trends in marketings, and quotas are assigned to 
producers on the basis of their probable relative market-
ings in 1959. 
Estimates of the regional and national payments are 
made using actual 1959 marketing figures. It is assumed 
that the government would have paid each producer the 
difference between the support and the annual weighted-
average market price for quota marketings. The hypo-
thetical support price is $14.70 per hundredweight - 80 
percent of the United States average price received by 
farmers for hogs from 1949 through 1958. The yearly 
weighted· average price is $14.07 per hundredweight; pay-
ments, therefore, would have been made at 63 cents per 
100 pounds marketed. Total payments are estimated for 
both methods of apportioning the quotas. The total pay-
ment would have been about $109,000,000 for either 
method of apportionment. This payment is about 12 per-
cent smaller than the $124,455,316 direct payment that 
would have' been required to extend payment coverage to 
all hogs marketed during 1959. 
If 1959 hog marketings could have been restricted 
to the quota, the estimated value of the smaller quota 
marketings would have been 11.44 percent greater than 
the actual value of the hog marketings in 1959. This 
would have raised the open-market price of hogs above 
the $14.70 support level so that no direct payments would 
have been required. 
The third program, which covers the restriction of 
payments to lightweight hogs, would help to stabilize hog 
prices and to support hog returns in two ways: (a) Di· 
rect payments would add to producers' returns directly; 
and (b) if the payments induced marketing at lighter 
weights, the total tonnage going to market would be reo 
duced in the short run, though not in the long run. 
The difference between the prices of different weights 
of hogs results from the relative supply and demand for 
hogs in the various weight groups. The price differential 
between light and heavy hogs would change as the per-
centage of lightweight hogs increased, and this even-
tually would offset part or all of the direct payments. 
Analysis of the historical relationship between the per-
centage of different weights of hogs and the price dif-
ferentials between them for the years 1956·59 shows that, 
as the ratio of light hogs to heavy hogs increases, the 
price differential between them decreases. On the average, 
a change of one in the ratio of light hogs to heavy hogs 
is associated with an opposite change of about 80 cents 
in the price differential, although this varies to some ex-
tent from year to year. 
The payments needed to induce farmers to market 
their hogs below, say, 200 pounds, would have to be at 
least equal to the profit that farmers would make by carry-
ing their hogs to heavier weights. 
In determining the most profitable marketing weight, 
comparisons are made between the cost of keeping the 
hogs for a given period and their increase in value during 
the period. The weight gains and amount of feed utilized 
are taken from Atkinson's and Klein's figures on feed 
consumption and weight gains. A hypothetical ration 
is formulated of corn, meat scraps and soybean meal in 
the proportions needed to make up a 10-percent protein 
feed. 
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On the basis of actual lJ.1eekly Chicago hog market 
prices, monthly United States feed prices, a farrowing 
date of April 15 and interest on investment at 5 percent 
per annum, the marginal revenues, marginal costs and 
incentive payments are calculated for 1949 through 1958. 
To add more precision to the analysis, 12 farrowing 
dates (the 15th of each month) also are included. Total 
revenues, marginal revenues and marginal costs are again 
calculated. Three different types of hog prices are used 
in the calculation of the total and marginal revenues: 
actual weekly Chicago hog prices for 1955 through 1959; 
a fixed price of $16.18 per hundredweight (derived by 
averaging weighted.average barrow and gilt prices at 
Chicago over the 5-year period, 1955 through 1959) ; and 
weekly moving. average prices for Chicago (averaged 
over the same 5-year period for comparison). 
The optimal marketing weights at which farmers re-
ceive the greatest amount of profit are calculated, and, 
from these, the incentive payments necessary to induce 
farmers to sell at or below 200 pounds are derived. It is 
assumed that the incentive payment must at least be 
equal to the profit the farmer could make by carrying 
his hogs to heavier weights. 
With the exception of 1955, the estimated costs of a 
program to induce farmers to sell their barrows and gilts 
at 200 pounds or below are smaller when the fixed price 
of $16.18 per hundredweight is used than when moving· 
average prices or actual prices are used. The variation 
in total cost of the program from year to year also is 
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less when the fixed price is used than when moving-
average or actual hog prices are used. This variation 
results from (a) variation in the number of barrows 
and gilts slaughtered and (b) variation in feed costs. 
The total costs of the program in 1956, 1957 and 
1958 would have been less when moving-average prices 
are used than when the actual prices are used. In 1955 and 
1959, the total costs would have been higher when moving-
average prices are used than when the actual prices are 
used. 
A direct-payment program of this type in the short 
run would reduce the total tonnage of pork coming to 
market. The estimated reduction in total pork production 
in 1959 is 587,389,680 pounds. This assumes a program 
that could lower the average weight of barrows and gilts 
in commercial slaughter from 228 to 220 pounds. This is 
equivalent to a reduction of 2,576,270 barrows and gilts 
that average 228 pounds. 
In the long run, however, the increase in the supply 
of lighter weight hogs relative to the supply of heavier 
weight hogs could cause the price differential between the 
two to become smaller - and possibly even to change in 
favor of the heavier hogs. This would offset part or all 
of the direct payment. A new equilibrium between prices 
of light and heavy hogs and the direct payment would be 
reached - unless this is compensated for by larger pay-
ments; Estimates are made of both the increase in price 
resulting from the decrease in production and of the in-
crease in production following this increase in price. 
Analysis of Direct-Payment Methods for Hogs 
To Increase Hog Producers' Incomes1 
by Geoffrey S. Shepherd, Donald D. Rohdy, 
James W. Gruebele and William D. Dobson 
In recent years, commodity loan and storage opera-
tions have been used extensively to implement price.sup-
port programs for storable agricultural products_ Pro-
grams of this sort have met with varying success. How· 
ever, their use for perishable products is limited. Pork, 
for example, cannot be stored for more than a few days 
fresh or for more than a few months cured or frozen 
before it will begin to deteriorate. 
Accordingly, different kinds of programs are being 
considered for perishable products. One of these pro-
grams would let prices seek their own level in the market 
and use direct payments to farmers to make up the dif-
ference between market prices and some preset level of 
price "support." This bulletin reports an analysis of 
how such a program might work for hogs. 
Economic Framework 
This study is concerned with the use of direct pay-
ments and production quotas for hogs in an attempt to 
increase hog producers' incomes. A statement of the basic 
problem is relatively simple. In the long run, a price 
below the equilibrium level, ceteris paribus, will dis-
courage production, and a price above that level, without 
effective controls on output, will result in surplus sup-
plies which depress prices and incomes. 
The cyclic pattern in hog slaughter and prices, as 
shown in fig. 1, is the result of producers' expectations of 
what prices will be at the end of one production period; 
i.e., the time required for gestation plus feeding - about 
10-12 months. Since current prices seem to be the major 
criterion for determining these expectations, errors are 
made, and the cycle is perpetuated. Producers do not 
react immediately to higher or lower prices. Instead, they 
wait for a period of several months to a year before 
making adjustments in their hog operations. As a con-
sequence, hog production and prices tend to move in 
about a 4-year cycle. 
These cyclic fluctuations in hog production and prices 
affect the hog-pork industry from the producer to the 
consumer. During the part of the cycle when hog produc. 
tion is low, labor and other production, processing and 
distribution resources are not fully used. Subsequently, 
IProject9 1442 and 1403 of the Iowa Agricultural and Home Eco-
nomics Experiment Station, Center for Agricultural and Economic Ad-
justment cooperating. 
they are overburdened when hog production is at its peak 
in the cycle. This increases costs which, in the end, are 
paid for by both the producer and consumer. From a sales 
standpoint, too, the customers that are lost during the 
period of low production and high prices are hard to 
win back during periods of lower prices - adding even 
greater impetus to the declining per capita consumption 
of pork (28). 
Direct payments establish a floor below which prices 
cannot fall - at least as far as the producer is con-
cerned. Prices are, in fact, free to fall or rise to any 
level, but the direct-payment procedure, in effect, es-
tablishes the minimum price that producers will receive. 
Therefore, in the producer's decision-making process, his 
expectation of future prices would begin with the guar-
anteed price and vary only upward from it. This elimi-
nates much of the uncertainty in his expectations - the 
exact amount depending on the level at which the guar-
anteed price is set. 
Direct payments for the purpose of stabilizing hog 
production and prices against the cyclical patterns shown 
in fig. 1 have been analyzed in an earlier report (28)_ 
For stabilization purposes, the base price "support" 
level would be set at a little below the long-run equi-
librium price, say $13 per 100 pounds. Then, whenever 
the market price of hogs declined below $13, for example, 
HOG SLAUGHTER AND PRICE 
PRICE SLAUGHTER 
(MIL. HEAD) (S PER CWT.) 
20 
40 10 
o~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~o 
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Fig. 1. Hog slaughter and price received by farmers, United States, 
1951·61. -
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to $12, the government would make up the difference in 
the form of a direct payment to the farmers of $1 per 
100 pounds for all hogs sold. This would keep returns up 
to average levels, so that farmers would not be driven by 
low prices to curtail hog production and thus to perpetu. 
ate the cycle. ' 
Direct payments to raise hog prices would be a dif· 
ferent matter. The "support" price for this purpose would 
be set above the long-run equilibrium price, say at $16 
per 100 pounds. But this would result in increased hog 
production - in response both to the higher prices and 
to less price uncertainty. This would tend to drive hog 
prices down, making larger direct payments necessary. 
And the payments would have to be made on an increas-
ing number of hogs. This could continue until public 
criticism of the size of payments forced a reduction in 
the base price. 
This report presents analyses of three types of direct-
payment programs, all of which are designed to increase 
hog producers' incomes. In general, the analysis of each 
program covers (a) farmer response in terms of output 
to price changes, (b) cost to the government for specific 
price changes and (c) benefits, if any, to farmers and con-
sumers.2 
Order of Presentation 
The first program analyzed would limit payments to a 
uniform number of hogs per producer; Canada adopted 
a program of this sort in 1960, setting the number at 
100 head. The second program would restrict payments 
to a national quota, and the third would restrict payments 
to lightweight hogs. 
These are considered in turn, beginning with a pro-
gram that would limit payments to a uniform number of 
hogs per producer. The Canadian government abandoned 
its price-support program for hogs in 1960 and replaced 
it with a direct-payment program of this sort. The support 
price for 1960 and 1961 was set at 80 percent of the 10-
year moving-average base price, which is the minimum 
support level allowed. Hence, the program is a price-
stabilizing program. However, even with the support price 
set at the 80·percent level, some of the price uncertainty 
is removed, and repercussions can be expected on the 
price expectations of hog producers. For this reason, 
as well as to obtain a knowledge of the first direct-
payment program used for hogs, we will first report on 
the Canadian program for the bearing it may have on 
possible direct-payment programs in the United States. 
THE CANADIAN DIRECT·PAYMENT PROGRAM 
The Canadian government adopted a system of "de-
ficiency payments" and other means of supporting farm 
incomes on Jan. 11, 1960 (18, p. 2). This program is ex-
amined to gain some knowledge of the operation and 
effect of a direct-payment program, which might be adapt-
able for use with United States hog producers. 
The Agricultural Stabilization Act 
In Canada, income support for farm products is pro-
20nly terminal results of these analyses are presented in this report. 
The supplemental materials referred to may be obtained by writing to 
the senior author, Department of Economies and Sociology, Iowa State 
University. Ames, Iowa. 
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vided by the Agricultural Stabilization Act. This act went 
into effect March 3, 1958 (17). Some of the features of the 
act are (22, pp. 2-3) : 
(a) Any agricultural product is eligible for support. 
The decision as to which product will be supported is the 
responsibility of the government. 
(b) Nine basic commodities are supported at all 
times. These commodities are: cattle, hogs, sheep, butter, 
cheese, eggs, wheat, oats and barley. The support provided 
to the nine basic commodities is at a minimum of 80 
percent of the average price of these commodities, at se-
lected markets across Canada, during the previous 10 
years. 
(c) Several methods of support are provided, in· 
cluding purchase and storage, direct payments, flat in-
come payments on a per-acre basis or any other method 
which might be considered most appropriate to meet the 
need. 
(d) The agency responsible for the administration of 
the act is the Agricultural Stabilization Board. 
Direct payments were, not used initially, after the pas-
sage of the Agricultural Stabilization Act in 1958, to 
support the incomes of Canadian hog producers. Instead, 
hog prices were maintained at support levels by direct 
purchase and storage of pork by the government. 
In April 1958, the Canadian government set a sup-
port price of $25 per hundredweight for grade A car· 
casses at Toronto (18, p. 44). This level of support was 
in effect until Oct. I, 1959, after which the support price 
was reduced to $23.65 per hundredweight at Toronto. 
This new lower support price was to be maintained until 
March 31, 1960. Both of the support prices were sea· 
sonally flat. 
By November 1958, preparations had been made by 
the Canadian government to make purchases of pork at 
public stockyards wherever and whenever necessary to 
maintain hog prices at support levels (13). Hog prices 
at public stockyards only were supported, and prices at 
other points were left to seek their own levels relative 
to public stockyard prices. 
The carcass cuts purchased by the Agricultural Sta-
bilization Board were prepared at government inspected 
plants in accordance with prescribed specifications and 
placed in cold storage in behalf of the board. Cuts were 
invoiced in balanced proportions; i.e., equal numbers 
of each cut. However, to promote maximum distribution 
and consumption, provisions were made to allow sellers 
to retain certain cuts which were likely to be in short sup-
ply. 
Figures on the actual pork accumulations of the 
Agricultural Stabilization Board are fragmentary. By 
May 1959, the Canadian government had accumulated 
70,000,000 pounds of pork in cold storage. Normal 
storage for this time of year is about 18,000,000 pounds 
(14). A preliminary ,estimate made in November 1959 
indicated that total marketings for 1959 would be about 
8,800,000 hogs (8, p. 45). This estimate indicated that 
domestic disappearance of pork would account for about 
7,000,000 of the hogs marketed. Exports of pork and 
hogs would account for an additional half million hogs. 
The surplus of approximately 1,300,000 hogs, or 14.8 
percent of the marketings, would be accounted for prin-
cipally by Agricultural Stabilization Board purchases. 
This quantity was considered too large to be handled 
by the government purchase program. Accordingly, in 
October 1959, the Canadian Department of Agriculture 
announced that the direct-purchase program would end 
after lan. 9, 1960, to be replaced by a direct-payment 
program (8, p. 44). The Canadian Department of Agri-
culture had previously announced that direct purchase of 
pork would continue until March 31, 1960. 
Some of the pork accumulated under purchase activ-
ities was canned to prevent spoilage. On March 4, 1960, 
after the termination of the direct-purchase method of 
support, Agricultural Stabilization Board holdings of 
canned pork consisted of 94,000,000 pounds of canned 
luncheon meat and 8,400,000 pounds of canned hams 
(10, p. ll). The canned luncheon meats were made avail-
able, free of charge in carload lots, to approved chari-
table institutions and welfare organizations in Canada 
and other countries. 
Figures on the value of pork inventories accumulated 
under the direct-purchase program are available from the 
annual reports of the Agricultural Stabilization Board. 
On March 31, 1959, pork inventories were valued at $20,-
836,220 (6, p. 2). On March 31, 1960, pork inventories 
were valued at $74,085,444 (7, p. 2). Pork inventories 
accounted for 62.9 percent of the total value of inventories 
held by the Agricultural Stabilization Board on March 31, 
1960. 
The Direct-Payment Program 
Minister of Agriculture Douglas Harkness indicated 
some of the policies behind present Canadian price- and 
income-support legislation in an address at a meeting 
of the National Farm Institute at Des Moines, Iowa, in 
February 1960 (22, p. 3). The policy objectives men-
tioned were: (a) providing security of income to the bulk 
of Canadian producers, (b) maintaining flexibility in 
the level of support and, as far as possible, flexibility in 
deciding which commodities are to be supported and (c) 
improving the quality of products marketed. The provis-
ions for carrying out these policies are evident in the 
Agricultural Stabilization Act and in the program of 
direct payments for hog producers as provided for under 
the act. 
In the direct-payment program for hogs, payments 
are made for a maximum of 100 grade A or grade B hogs 
per registered producer (22, p. 5). Canadian Minister of 
Agriculture Douglas Harkness reported that, prior to 
1960, about 90 percent of the producers in Canada had 
commonly marketed less than 100 grade A or grade B 
hogs per year. For this reason, the limit was set at 100 
head (21, p. 5). Rackham (26) reported that, in 1959, 
about 70 percent of the hogs marketed in Canada could 
have been included under the limit. 
Canadian hog producers are required to register with 
the Department of Agriculture, indicating their intention 
to participate in the program, and receive a registration 
number to become eligible for direct payments. Each 
producer is required to give the legal description of the 
location of his hog enterprise in applying for a regis-
tration number (15). Only one registration number is 
issued per farm, and only 100 hogs are eligible for direct 
payments from each farm, regardless of the number of 
owners. The Canadian government can prevent payments 
from being made for more than 100 hogs from each en-
terprise when the legal location of each enterprise is 
known. 
When hogs are sold and graded, the producer's reg-
istration number is recorded on the carcass grading cer-
tificate. Carcass graders then forward copies of the grad-
ing certificates to the data processing unit of the Canadi-
an Department of Agriculture where the number of grade 
A and grade B hogs marketed by each producer is re-
corded (15). The Canadian government can use these 
figures to determine the number of hogs eligible for direct 
payments from each producer when direct payments are 
necessary. 
Approximately 183,000 producers registered to par-
ticipate in the deficiency-payment program in 1960 (2). 
This is about 64 percent of the total number of farms in-
dicating a hog enterprise at the time of the 1956 census. 
However, some of the producers, who indicated a hog en-
terprise at the time of the census, raised hogs only for 
home consumption (16). 
The program provides for an annual determination of 
payment size and payment distribution. No provisions are 
made for interim payments. At the end of the year, the 
Canadian Department of Agriculture computes the an-
nual weighted average price of grade A carcasses from 
the weekly prices paid at the major Canadian markets. 
If this price is less than the support price, each registered 
producer receives the difference between the annual 
weighted average price of grade A carcasses and the 
support price for a maximum of 100 grade A or grade 
B hogs. The program requires that the same payment per 
hundredweight be made for all hogs sold that were eligi-
ble for direct payments. The difference between the sup-
port price and the national weighted average price of 
grade A carcasses also determines the size of the direct 
payment for grade B carcasses. 
For 1960, the support price for grade A carcasses was 
set at $22.65 per hundredweight (23). This was 80 per-
cent of the lO-year average base price and the minimum 
level of support allowed under the Agricultural Stabili-
zation Act. The support price for 1961 was again set at 
$22.65. 
Seasonal price patterns are left intact by this pro-
gram. Producers are induced to get the maximum price 
per hundredweight for each hog sold. The direct payment 
an individual producer could receive is independent of 
his sales price. Though this program does not remove all 
price uncertainty for the producer, it does place a floor 
below which the yearly national weighted average price 
cannot deviate. This floor pertains only to the producer, 
since the market price is free to rise or fall to any 
level. Hence, certain repercussions can be expected on 
the price expectations of hog producers. 
From the standpoint of an individual producer, how-
ever, much of the price uncertainty remains under this 
direct-payment program. This is because the size of the 
direct payment per hundredweight cannot be determined 
until the end of the year. Producers could market hogs 
at prices substantially below the support price and not 
receive direct payments, since price increases later in the 
year could raise the national weighted-average price above 
the support level, and no payments would be made at the 
end of the year. 
Initial effects of the program 
Some congestion occurred at Canadian markets im-
mediately before the transition from the direct-purchase 
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to the deficiency. payment program. Producers marketed 
hogs in increased numbers at weights too light to qualify 
as grades A or B in an effort to market as many hogs as 
possible before the end of the direct.purchase program. 
The associate director of the Livestock Division, Can· 
ada Department of Agriculture, made an appeal to pro-
ducers for an orderly change-over to the deficiency-pay-
ment program in December 1959 (15). Producers were 
told that clogging markets would mean delayed slaughter 
and unnecessary shrinkage, that the government quality 
bonus would not be paid for hogs too light to grade A 
or B and that lightweight hogs are subject to a packer 
discount of about $3.50 per hundredweight below that 
paid for grade A hogs. 
Marketings during the first week of January exceeded 
the slaughtering capacity of most plants, and some hogs 
had to be carried over for slaughter into the next week 
(10, p. 11). 
Estimating the effect of the deficiency-payment pro-
gram on marketings is difficult. The marketing figures 
are fragmentary, and some are of a preliminary nature. 
Farrowings were down 7 percent during June through 
August of 1959 as compared with the same period in 
1958 (9, p. 11) _ This reduction in farrowings occurred 
before the formal announcement in October 1959 by the 
Canadian Department of Agriculture that direct purchase 
of pork would end Jan. 9, 1960. There were earlier 
announcements, however, that the direct.purchase pro-
gram would be replaced as soon as feasible by a direct-
payment program. A December 1959 survey of pigs on 
farms showed a smaller percentage decrease than is 
normal for the cyclical downturn, according to past reo 
lationships (10, p. 12). 
Marketings in 1960 declined considerably from 1959 
cyclical peak levels. Preliminary estimates for the first 
three quarters of 1960 indicated declines of 10 percent, 14 
percent and 31 percent, respectively, in average weekly 
slaughter as compared with the same quarters in 1959 
(11, p. 10). An estimate derived from a June 1, 1960, 
survey of pigs on farms indicated a 27-percent decrease 
in average weekly marketings for the last quarter of 1960 
as compared with 1959. 
The downturn in marketings during 1960 allowed the 
Agricultural Stabilization Board to dispose of much of 
the surplus cold storage stocks accumulated under the 
direct-purchase program. Domestic disappearance and 
exports during the summer months of 1960 exceeded 
market supplies (12, p. 14). Cold storage stocks were 26 
million pounds at the end of July, compared with 50 
million pounds at the beginning of May and with 72 
million pounds at the same date a year earlier. Cold stor-
age stocks were reduced to normal operating levels at the 
end of the summer. 
At the beginning of the deficiency-payment program 
there was some concern about increased Canadian pork 
exports to the United States. There was a probability that 
the United States would impose countervailing duties on 
pork imports from Canada with the beginning of the 
direct-payment program (9, p. 12). In an effort to prevent 
a countervailing duty from being enacted, the Canadian 
government imposed an equaliziation fee which would 
compensate for any subsidies that would be paid under 
the deficiency-payment program. This removed the sub-
sidy from some Canadian exports to the United States. 
Exports to the United States of primal cuts or products 
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of primal cuts from hogs eligible for deficiency payments 
may be made only under a special export permit which 
is issued only on payment of the equalization fee. Exports 
of other pork products are made on an open permit and 
are not subject to the equalization fee. The equalization 
fee export provision went into effect Jan. 25,1960. 
The reaction of producers to the program 
Officials of the Canadian government met a consid-
erable amount of opposition from producer groups when 
they announced that the direct-purchase method of sup-
port would be replaced by direct payments. Large-scale 
producers complained that they - the most efficient pro-
ducers - were unfairly discriminated against by the 
limit.of.payments provision. Contracting firms and large-
scale producers had expanded feeding and rearing facil-
ities, assuming that the direct-purchase program would 
continue. 
The direct-purchase program, while in effect in 1958 
and 1959, guaranteed most large.scale producers that hog 
prices would not decline below their production costs. 
Support levels had been set on the basis of costs of pro· 
duction. As mentioned earlier, the support price was set 
at $25 per hundredweight at Toronto for 1958. This sup-
port level was in effect until Oct. I, 1959, after which it 
was lowered to $23.65 at Toronto. 
Under the direct.payment program, the large-scale 
producers could receive subsidies for only 100 hogs. 
Many large-scale producers and contracting firms planned 
cutbacks or withdrawals from hog production after the 
details of the direct.payment program became known 
(26) . 
At the outset, small-scale producers complained 
because their immediate returns would be low. Those who 
marketed hogs early in 1960 feared that a price rise later 
in the year would raise the grade A average price above 
the support level so that no direct payment of any size 
would be made. 
The fact that direct payments would be made only at 
the end of the year was disliked by many producers. There 
were demands for interim payments early in 1960. How-
ever, price increases associated with lower hog market-
ings later in the year decreased the demands for interim 
payments. 
Some producers found it difficult to understand the 
operation of the program. Among these were producers 
who thought they could receive no payments if they 
sold hogs at prices above the support level. Others thought 
that, if they sold hogs at any price below the support 
level, the difference, no matter how large, would be made 
up by the government. 
Possible Adaptations for United States Hog Producers 
The Canadian deficiency-payment program for hogs 
has four primary characteristics. These are: (a) the use 
of a moving.average base price, (b) the limitation of pay· 
ments to 100 head of hogs per producer, (c) the limita-
tion of payments to high-grade hogs in an effort to im-
prove the quality of hogs marketed and to reduce pro-
gram costs and (d) the provision for making the pay-
ments on an annual basis. 
These features are discussed in the order presented, 
and a brief appraisal is made of their applicability for a 
direct-payment program for the United States producers. 
A moving-average base price 
A moving-average base price has some characteristics 
that make it superior to parity as a method of establish-
ing a support level. Parity prices are affected by economic 
conditions that existed in the distant past. Parity prices 
also tend to overvalue some commodities relative to others 
although this effect has been reduced by the use of "mod: 
ernized parity" (21, p_ 696). Technology generally has 
contributed more to cost reduction in the production of 
crops than of livestock. The result has been an overvalu-
ation of certain crops, such as cotton and wheat. A mov-
ing-average base price embodies more recent economic 
relationships than do parity prices. 
A shorter base period than the 10-year period used 
by the Canadians could be used. The shorter moving 
average, however, would be affected to a greater extent 
by periods of large or small marketings. For example, 1 
year of very small marketings could cause a sizable in-
crease in a 4-year moving-average base price. 
The fact that the support price is 80 percent of the 
previous lO-year moving-average base price means that 
the Canadian government does not intend to raise hog 
returns (prices plus payments) above long.run equilib-
rium levels. They will protect producers only from price 
declines th~t are greater than 20 percent below average. 
The CanadIan program, therefore, is a price-stabilizing 
program - not a price-raising program. 
Limitation of payments to 100 hogs per producer 
The reasons why the payments are limited to 100 hogs 
per producer are not clear. If prices (returns) were to 
be supported above long-run levels, a limitation of this 
sort might be imposed in an attempt to limit total pro-
duction and to keep it within the bounds of quantities that 
could be sold at the higher prices. But since prices (re· 
turns) are to be supported only at 80 percent of previous 
average levels, no quantity limitations appear to be nec-
essary. A support price set at 100 percent of previous 
average levels could be expected to increase production, 
but the provision of price certainty at only 80 percent of 
previous average levels can't be expected to increase pro-
duction enough to depress prices below 80 percent of 
previous levels. 
It is possible that the subsidies are allocated in pro-
portion to need, rather than in proportion to the total 
number of hogs sold, when the payments are limited to 
a maximum number of hogs per producer. Huge sub-
sidies to large-scale producers, who may have more than 
adequate incomes without additional government aid, 
are eliminated. However, the limit·of-payments provision 
could also discourage large-scale producers and serve as 
a subsidy to inefficiency. 
limitation of payments to high-grade hogs 
A limit-of-payments provision designed to improve 
the quality of hogs marketed would be difficult to incor-
porate in a direct-payment plan for United States hog 
producers. Some hog buyers find it difficult to estimate 
accurately the grade and value of the pork cuts a hog 
will yield when slaughtered. Some undervaluation and 
overvaluation of hogs occurs with the live-animal grad-
ing system. As a result, slaughter hogs of the same class 
and within the same weight range usually sell at about 
the same price per hundredweight (19, p. 51). The 
grades used by different meat packers also vary. An im-
proved, standardized live-animal grading svstem or a 
carcass grading system would seem neces~ary before 
payments could be limited to producers of high-quality 
hogs in the United States. 
Annual payment procedure 
The annual payment procedure has administrative 
and economic advantages. Administrative expense is 
lessened by making only one payment to each producer 
at the end of the year. The problems involved in setting 
seasonally adjusted base prices do not occur. Producers 
are induced to get the maximum price for each hog sold. 
The program provides no incentive for producers to 
increase marketings during periods of heavy seasonal 
marketings to reduce production costs. 
The annual procedure adopted for making the direct 
payments, although administratively less expensive than 
making interim payments, was disliked by some Canadian 
producers. They did not like the idea of waiting 1 to 12 
months for direct payments that they were not sure of 
receiving. Also, much of the price uncertainty remains 
when the the payment size is determined by the difference 
between the weighted-average market price and the sup-
port price for the entire year. 
. The procedure used by the Canadians for making the 
duect payments could be adapted to a direct-payment 
program for United States producers. A variation of this 
type of payment determination is currently used in the 
direct-payment program for wool producers. Under the 
wool program, each producer receives the percentage 
required to increase the national average wool price per 
pound up to the incentive level - 62 cents per pound -
at the end of the marketing year (38, p_ 17) _ A program 
that would provide payments after every week or month, 
if the average market price dropped below the support 
level, might be preferred by producers. If the weekly 
or monthly prices were announced a sufficient time in ad-
vance, price uncertainty could also be lessened to a 
greater degree, and greater efficiency in resource alloca-
tion could be achieved. 
A direct-payment program with monthly support 
prices would be simpler to administer than one with 
weekly support prices. The government would establish 
and announce 12 support prices rather than 52_ Objec-
tio.ns can be raised against the use of monthly support 
pnces, however. A monthly support price might induce 
producers to hold hogs over for 1 or 2 weeks to take 
advantage of a higher support price the next month. 
Objections also could be raised by producers if sharp 
price changes occurred within a month. For example, if 
the program made up the difference between the average 
market price and the support price for a month, a pro-
ducer who sold hogs early in the month, when prices 
were high, would get a substantially greater total return 
than the producer who sold later in the month after a 
significant price decline. 
Figure 2 shows the average percentage of the yearly 
barrow and gilt marketings at eight terminal markets3 
for each week and the average weekly prices for 1956 
3The eight tenninal markets are Chicago St. Louis Kansas City 
Omaha. Sioux City. St. Joseph. St. Paul and Indianapolis. • • 
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Fig. 2. Average weekly barrow and gilt prices and the average per· 
cent marketed each week at eight terminal markets, 1956 through 1959. 
through 1959 (33). The price variations associated with 
the variations in marketings are fairly great within some 
months. It seems likely that weekly support prices would 
be needed to take this detailed price variation into ac· 
count. 
A weekly support price could be established at some 
percentage of the average weekly prices during the past 
period. The weekly support levels could be determined 
and announced approximately a year and a half in ad· 
vance. The weekly support prices could then serve as 
forward prices for production planning.4 
A long or short base period could be used to compute 
the weekly base prices. The base period would probably 
have to be at least 4 years to average out the effects of 
the hog cycle. A IQ.year moving. average weekly base 
price, however, might be criticized because some of the 
prices used to compute it are influenced by economic con· 
ditions too many years in the past. If fewer years are used 
to compute the moving. average weekly base price, how· 
ever, it is affected to a greater extent by weeks of large 
or small marketings and by shifts in seasonal patterns. 
The difficulties of establishing these weekly support 
prices a year and a half in advance (or longer, if pro· 
ducers are to be notified in time to retain more or fewer 
sows for breeding· purposes rather than market them 
for slaughter) are very great. Forecasts of prices made 
by Wilbur Maki at Iowa State in recent years have been 
reasonably accurate up to a year in advance, but beyond 
that period they become unreliable. Government price 
analysts attempting to set price.support levels, below 
which direct payments would be made, would have to 
take several unpredictable future government actions into 
account - for example, new feed.grain programs, (who 
can say what feed.grain programs we will have 2 years 
from now). The analysts must also consider the rather 
unpredictable effect that the announcement of a direct· 
payment level of price supports would have on hog pro· 
duction and, therefore, on hog prices. 
4Don Rohdy developed a refined and somewhat more complicated 
system of establishing direct-payment support prices based on the pro· jection of postwar seasonality trends for various harrow and gilt weight 
groups. An outline of this procedure is availahle from the senior author. 
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Considerations of this sort mean that many more 
resources would need to be devoted to building the 
foundation of factual and analytical methods for price 
projections before it would be sensible to try to put a 
direct· payments program into effect. Such considerations 
also mean that the level of support would need to be 
conservative until considerable experience had been 
gained. 
In the alternative direct· payment programs for United 
States producers considered in the following sections, 
several features of the Canadian program are used. 
Some of the features are used without change; others are 
modified in an attempt to fit them to the objectives of in· 
dividual programs. 
ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF PAYMENTS LIMITED TO A 
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF HOGS PER PRODUCER 
The first program considered is a direct.payment pro· 
gram for United States producers that would limit pay· 
ments to a maximum number of hogs per producer. The 
features of this program are similar to the Canadian 
program, with the exception of the quality restriction 
on payments. No attempt is made to estimate the effects 
of restricting payments to producers of high.quality hogs. 
For this program, estimates are made of the effects 
of alternative sizes of limits that might be imposed. Es· 
timates are made of the percentage of producers who 
could have had their entire hog sales subsidized, and the 
percentage of volume that could have been subsidized 
under alternative limits to obtain estimates of the extent 
of program coverage. 
All estimates are based on 1954 figures, since this was 
the last year for which the needed census data were avail· 
able at the time of the study. All programs considered 
assume 100 percent producer participation. 
Estimated Effects of Alternative Size Limits 
The effects of two alternative size limits are estimated 
- a 100.hog limit and a 200.hog limit. Smaller size 
limits could have been considered, but a preliminary 
investigation indicated that the smaller limits would have 
been highly restrictive. 
It is hypothesized that a limit on the size of payments 
would have different effects in different areas of the 
country. Areas with generally small hog farms would 
have a higher proportion of sales eligible for subs~dy. 
The effects of limiting payments are estimated on a regIOn· 
al basis to test this hypothesis. The following section in· 
volves the computation of the percentage of p~oduc~rs 
in the various regions who would have had theIr entIre 
sales subsidized under the alternative limits. 
Percentage of producers completely subsidized 
The 1954 Agricultural Census gives the number of 
producers who sold less than 100 hogs and less than 2~0 
hogs and also gives the total number of producers In 
each region (44 p. 505). Estimates of the percentages of 
producers who 'could have had their e~tir.e sales subsi· 
ized under the 100.hog and 200.hog hmlt.of.paymen~s 
provisions are computed from these figures: These estl' 
mates for the nine Agricultural Census regIOns and for 
the United States are given in table 1. 
Table 1. Percent of producers with sales completely subsidized, by 
region and for the United States under hypothetical limited 
direct.payment programs, 1954." 
100-hog limit 200-hog limit 
Area Producers completely Producers completely 
subsidized subsidized 
New England ........................................ 92.8 
Middle Atlantic .. "................................ 97.6 
East North-Central............................ 84.2 
West North-Central .. ,......................... 81.9 
South Atlantic ..... ................................ 98.1 
East South-Central ................... ,.......... 98.3 
West South-Central............................ 98.6 
Mountain ........... , ..... ,.............................. 97.2 
Pacific ................................... , ................ 93.2 
United States ....... ,................................ 89.2 
'Computed from U. S. Census of Agriculture (44, p. 505). 
95.8 
98.9 
94.9 
95.9 
99.5 
99.6 
99.6 
99.2 
97.1 
97.0 
A considerable amount of variation in the size of en-
terprise existed among the regions. A high percentage of 
the producers in the South Atlantic region are small·scale 
producers; 98.1 percent marketed fewer than 100. hogs 
in 1954. By contrast, 81.9 percent of the producers III the 
West North-Central region sold fewer than 100 hogs. 
Nationally 89.2 percent sold fewer than 100 hogs, and 97 
percent sold fewer than 200. 
With payments limited to 100 hogs per producer, over 
98 percent of the producers in the three southern regions 
could have had their entire sales subsidized in 1954. A 
] OO-hog restriction on the size of payment would have 
had the least unfavorable effect on these producers. A 
program that would have allowed payments for a maxi-
mum of 200 hogs would have permitted complete subsi-
dization for over 95 percent of the producers in all 
regions except the East North-Central, and even there 
the percentage would have been 94.9. 
Percentage of volume subsidized 
Estimates next are made of the number and percentage 
of hogs that could have been subsidized under the al-
ternative limits. Here again, the estimates are made on 
the basis of 1954 Census of Agriculture figures.s For the 
lOO-hog limit, the number that would have been eligible 
is the sum of the marketings from producers selling less 
than 100 hogs per year, plus 100 hogs each from pro-
ducers selling over 100 hogs. The number eligible under 
the 200-hog limit is the sum of the marketings of pro-
ducers selling less than 200 hogs, plus 200 hogs from each 
producer marketing over 200. 
Table 2 shows the total hogs sold and the estimated 
number and percentage of hogs eligible for direct pay-
~ A detailed description of the estimation procedure used Is available 
from the senior author. 
ments under the limited payment programs. The estimates 
are given for each region, Iowa and the United States. For 
the United States, the estimated number of hogs eligible 
for direct payments is the sum of the regional totals. Iowa 
estimates are included separately because of the state's 
relative importance in hog production. The Iowa estimates 
are also included in the West North-Central approxima-
tions. 
For the United States, the estimated percentage of hogs 
sold in 1954 that could have been subsidized under a di-
rect-payment program with a 100-head limit is 80.2 per-
cent. The regional figures indicate that a 100-hog limit 
would have had a larger income effect on producers in 
the southern regions. The approximate figures indicate 
that over 95 percent of the hogs sold in these regions 
would have been eligible for direct payments under the 
program with the 100-hog payment restriction. Producers 
in the New England and Pacific regions would have had 
a considerably smaller percentage of their hogs eligible-
only about 50 percent. Obviously, the large-scale pro-
ducers in these regions marketed a major portion of the 
hogs. Producers in the East North-Central and West 
North-Central regions would have had about 75 percent 
of their sales eligible for direct payments. The number 
of hogs that would have been excluded from considera-
tion in determining payments, however, is greater from 
these regions than from all of the other regions combined. 
A direct-payment program that would have limited 
payments to 200 hogs per producer would have allowed 
payments for an estimated 93.6 percent of the hogs sold in 
the United States in 1954. A 200-hog limit provision would 
have been considerably less restrictive on producers in the 
East and West North-Central regions. It would have al-
lowed payments for approximately 9~ percent of the h?gs 
sold in the West North-Central regIOn - the most Im-
portant hog.producing region. For the United States, an 
estimated 7,841,044 more hogs would have been eligible 
for direct payments if payments had been made for a 
maximum of 200 hogs per producer, rather than 100. 
A Cost Comparison Between Limited and 
Unlimited Direct-Payment Programs 
A direct-payment program that would provide pay-
ments for all hogs would make it possible for producers in 
all regions to get a greater subsidy than if limits are 
placed on the size of payments to individual producers, 
provided the payment per hundredweight is the same un-
der both programs. The previous estimates indicate, how-
ever, that as a group, the producers in the southern 
regions would have had the best relative position if pay· 
100-hog limit 200-hog limit 
Area 
Total 
hogs 
sold 
Number Percent Number 
eligible 
Percent 
eligible 
New England ................................... . 
Middle Atlantic ............................... . 
East North-Central ....................... . 
West North-Central ....................... . 
South Atlantic ................................ .. 
East South-Central ........................ .. 
West South· Central ....................... . 
W~~W::I~ ... :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
Iowaa ................................................. . 
United States .................................. .. 
154,724 
901,333 
19,098.663 
28.667.737 
3,665,380 
2,898,591 
1,712,700 
631,514 
799.716 
14,344,666 
58,530,358 
GAlBO included in West North-Central estimates. 
eligible eligible 
75,018 
703,062 
14,483,203 
22,685,236 
3,574,203 
2,840,441 
1.640,222 
500,944 
420.045 
10.000.100 
46,922,374 
48.5 
78.0 
75.8 
79.1 
97.5 
98.0 
96.8 
79.3 
52.6 
69.7 
80.2 
97,060 
740,967 
17,783,855 
26,958,832 
3,613,698 
2,853,373 
1,676,638 
528,815 
510,180 
12,993,142 
54.763.418 
62.7 
82.2 
93.1 
94.0 
98.6 
98.4 
97.9 
83.7 
63.8 
90.6 
93.6 
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ments hact been restricted; a greater portion of their hogs 
would have been eligible for payments. 
For comparison, estimates are made of the cost to the 
government under three hypothetical programs. The 
first program is constructed with no limit to the size of 
payments to individual producers; i.e., all hogs are 
assumed eligible for direct payments. The cost of these 
payments to the government is compared with the cost of 
those made under programs containing restrictions that 
limit payments to 100 and 200 hogs per producer. 
Estimating the unlimited payments 
A hypothetical direct payment of $2 per hundred-
weight is made for all hogs sold under the program that 
would provide unlimited payments. A payment of this size 
would have been made if the government had decided 
to increase the national average price of hogs by $2 per 
hundredweight by using an annual payment procedure. 
The $2-per-hundredweight payment is chosen merely for 
illustration. No subsidies would have been likely during 
a year when hog prices were as high as in 1954, unless 
the objectives of the program required that payments be 
mad~ during times of both high and low prices. 
The average weight of hogs commercially slaughtered 
within each state in hundreds of pounds (40, p. 326) is 
multiplied by $2 to estimate the average direct payment 
per hog. Total payments to producers in each state are 
estimated by multiplying the. average payment per hog 
by the number of hogs sold (44, p. 505). This procedure 
is used to estimate the total cost of the payments in all 
states. 
Regional payment totals are estimated by adding the 
payments that would have been made to producers in 
each of the states within the regions. The regional pay· 
ment totals are shown in table 3 along with payment 
totals for Iowa and the United States. . 
The estimate of the total cost of the payments in table 
3 shows how much it would have cost the government 
to give producers an arbitrarily selected payment of $2 
per hundredweight. The estimate has greatest significance 
as a comparative device. It allows a percentage cost com-
parison between limited and unlimited direct-payment 
programs. It also allows an investigation of the effects 
of differences in marketing weights upon the regional al-
location of the direct payments. 
Estimating the limited payments 
The effects of limiting the size of payments are es-
timated next. Payments are made in proportion to the 
number of hogs eligible for direct payments from eac~ 
state. Payment size is again a flat $2 per hundredweight. 
Average payments per hog are the same as under the pro· 
gram that would have allowed direct payments for all 
hogs. The only difference between the programs is that the 
Table 3. Allocation of the unlimited direct payments. 
Area 
New England ............................. . 
Middle Atlantic ........................ .. 
East North-Central .................. .. 
West North-Central ................. . 
South Atlantic .......................... .. 
East South-Central .................. .. 
West South-Central ................. . 
Mountain ..................................... . 
Pacific ......................................... . 
Iowa ............................................. . 
United State. .. ........................... . 
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Payment 
(dollars) 
764,337 
3,924,831 
93,917,113 
145,169,210 
15,180,050 
13,160,176 
7,714,952 
2,922,697 
3,686,166 
73,444,690 
286,439.632 
Percent 
of 
payment 
0.27 
1.37 
32.79 
50.68 
5.30 
4.59 
2.69 
1.02 
1.29 
25.64 
100.00 
Table 4. Allocation of limited direct payments - payments limited to 
100 hogs per producer, 1954. 
Area 
New England ...................... . 
Middle Atlantic ................... . 
East North-Central ........... . 
West North-Central .......... .. 
South Atlantic .................... . 
East South-Central ............ . 
West South-Central 
Mountain ............................... . 
Pacific ................................... . 
Iowa ...................................... .. 
United States ..................... . 
Payment 
(dollars) 
370.589 
3,085,959 
71,076,502 
114,751.351 
14.794,858 
12,888,568 
7.888.780 
2.300,110 
1.917,481 
51,200510 
228.573,598 
Percent 
of 
payment 
0.16 
1.35 
31.10 
50.20 
6.47 
5.64 
3.23 
1.01 
0.84 
22.40 
100.00 
Percent of 
unlimited 
payment 
48.48 
78.62 
75.68 
79.05 
97.46 
97.94 
95.77 
78.80 
52.02 
69.71 
79.80 
average payment per hog for producers in each state 
now is multiplied by the number of hogs eligible for di-
rect payments, rather than by all hogs. It is assumed that 
the average weight of the subsidized hogs would have 
been the same as that of all hogs commercially slaugh-
tered within each state. 
Table 4 gives the payments allotted to producers in 
each region, Iowa and the United States under a program 
that would have payments limited to a basis of 100 hogs 
per producer. 
Limiting payments to 100 hogs per producer would 
have reduced the cost of the program by an estimated 
$57,865,934, a reduction in cost of about 20 percent. Pro-
ducers in the regions with the highest percentage of hogs 
eligible would have received a greater percentage of the 
total payment under the program that would have limited 
payments to 100 hogs per producer. The percentage in-
crease, however, would not have been large. Producers 
in the South Atlantic region would have received 5.30 
percent of the national payment under the program im-
posing no size of payment restriction. These producers 
would have received an estimated 6.47 percent of the 
national payment under the program restricting payments 
to 100 hogs per producer. Producers in the East South-
Central region would have received 1.05 percent more 
of the total payment under the program imposing a 100-
hog limit, as compared with the program allowing pay-
ments for all hogs. 
The payments to producers in the New England and 
Pacific regions 'would have been only about half as great 
with. the 100.hog payment restriction. Although only 
about 7 'percent of the producers in the New England 
region sold over' 100 hogs, these producers sold over 
50 percent of the hogs. The figures in column 3 of table 
4 are highly correlated with the estimated perce~tage of 
hogs eligible for direct payments from each reglOn. T~e 
deviation from these figures can be attributed to the dIf-
ference in average payments per hog. For example: pro· 
ducers' in-the-Mountain region sold their hogs at hghter 
weights, making their average payment per hog less; and 
consequently, received slightly less of the total nattonal 
payment than their percent of eligibility would suggest. 
The regional differences in marketing weights, however, 
had very little effect on payment allocation. 
Table 5 gives the payment details for the hypothe-
tical direct.payment program with a 200-hog payme~t 
restriction. The total cost to the government under thIS 
program would have been $267,753,861, or an estimated 
$18 685 671 less than the cost of the program that would hav~ all~wed payments for all hogs. This is a reduction of 
about 6 percent. 
The cost of the program that would have allowed 
payments for 200 hogs per producer would have been 
Table 5.' Allocation of limited direct payments - paymentldimited to 
200 hogs per p,radilcer, 1954. ." 
Area 
New England ....................... . 
Middle Atlantic ................... . 
East North-Central ........... . 
West North-Central ........... . 
South Atlantic .................. . 
East South-Central ............ .. 
West South-Central ........... . 
Mountain ............................... . 
Pacific .................................. . 
t'ci~ed··St~i~~··::::::::::::::.::::::::: 
Payment 
(dollars) 
479,476 
3,246,296 
87,368,508 
136.452,417 
14,960,710 
12,925,780 
7,552,822 
2,484,544 
2,333,30S 
66,524.887 
267,753.861 
Percent 
of 
payment 
0.18 
1.21 
82.63 
50.96 
5.59 
4.83 
2.82 
0.91 
0.S7 
24.85 
100.00 
Percent of 
unlimited 
payment 
62.73 
82.71 
93.03 
94.00 
98.55 
98.22 
97.90 
83.30 
63.30 
90.58 
93.77 
$39,180,263 (or about 17 percent) greater than the pro-
gram that would have limited payments to 100 hogs per 
producer. A large part of the increase in total cost can be 
attributed to the greater payments that would have been 
required for producers in the North Central regions. 
Total payments to producers in these regions would have 
been an estimated $37,993,072 higher with payments 
limited to 200 hogs per producer. 
Effects of a 100- or 200·Hog Limit 
on Production Efficiency 
. ~ direct-payment program with a 100- or 200-hog 
hm1t could have adverse effects on production efficiency 
in subsequent years. These adverse effects would occur 
if small-scale, less efficient producers were to expand out-
put to the point where the depressing effect on prices 
would make production in excess of the limit unprofitable 
for some large-scale producers. 
Figure 3 shows the hypothetical situation that pro-
ducers would face in making production decisions under 
a direct-payment program that limited payments to a 
maximum of 100 hogs per producer. The example rep-
reEents a situation where the support price is announced 
in advance. 
The producer's marginal revenue curve is discon-
tinuous at the output level of 100 hogs. For the first 
1O~ hogs sold, the marginal revenue curve is the support 
prIce, OP1 and, for sales exceeding this number the 
marginal revenue curve is the open-market price at ~ome 
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Fig. 3. Production planning under a hypothetical limited direct-pay-
ment program. 
lower level, OP2• MCl shows the hypothetical marginal 
cost curve of a producer who, before the limited direct-
payment program, sold fewer than 100 hogs. If this pro-
ducer were guaranteed the support price, he would in-
crease sa~es to 100 hogs to maximize profit. MC2 shows 
the margmal cost curve of a producer who, before the 
program, marketed 100 hogs. This producer would re-
ceive a greater net return for his sales because of lower 
production costs, but it would not be profitable for him to 
expand production beyond the number of hogs eligible 
for payments. In this hypothetical case, the less efficient 
producer is given an inducement to expand output, while 
the more efficient producer would maintain his sales at 
pre-program levels. 
Whether the producer who marketed more than the 
number of hogs eligible for payments would maintain his 
previous level of production, or reduce production, would 
first depend upon his individual cost structure. Pro-
duction in excess of the limit would be profitable if the 
marginal revenue from producing each hog in. excess of 
the limit were greater than the marginal cost. Second the 
price effects of such a program on small-scale prod~cers 
may differ from the price effects on large-scale producers; 
e.g., as .sma~l-sca~e producers expand output, price drops, 
and thIS mIght mduce large-scale producers to curtail 
production. 
Cost estimates for various sizes of enterprises would 
give an indication of the differences in total resource cost 
that would result if small-scale producers were induced 
by a limited direct-payment program, to produce a greate; 
portion of the nation's hogs. 
Estimates of the cost of production for various sizes 
of enterprises are rare. Purdue University, however, pub-
lishe.d some data which indicate a variation in hog pro-
ductIon costs (3). These have some value in estimating 
the possible effects of a limited direct-payment program. 
In the Purdue study, costs and returns for various sizes 
of enterprises ranging from 5 to 120 sows were com-
puted. Table 6 shows the summarized estimates of aver-
age costs and returns per hundredweight for 130 Indiana 
hog enterprises. 
These estimates were computed from data collected 
during 1956 and 1957 from producers with herds of from 
5 to 120 sows, all on a two-litter basis. The data were 
adjusted to a corn.hog ratio of 13.6 to 1 - long-time 
Indiana averages - with corn valued at $1.21 per bushel 
and hogs at $16.50, adjusted seasonally to reflect the aver-
age situation. Labor was charged at $1 per hour for all 
enterprises. 
~igure 4 gives an appro~imation of the average pro-
ductIOn costs per hundredweIght expressed in number of 
Table 6. Costs and returns per hundredweight for various sizes of 
Indiana hog enterprises.-
Number 
of sows 
5-14 ...................................................... . 
15-24 ....................................................... . 
25-34 ....................................................... . 
35-44 ....................................................... . 
45-54 ............................•.•......................... 
55-64 ....................................................... . 
65+ ....................................................... . 
Cost per 
hundredweight 
(dollars) 
16.86 
15.62 
15.78 
14.86 
14.56 
14.50 
15.21 
"Data from Bauman and Eisgruber (3). 
Net return per 
hUAdredwelghtb 
(dollars) 
0.03 
0.81 
1.09 
1.91 
2.03 
2.20 
1.62 
bTh~ net returns are affected by the average variation in the prices 
at the dIfferent seasons of the year when the hogs were sold as well as 
by the differences in cost. of producing the hogs. ' 
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hogs sold. These figures represent costs for a single 
season's farrowings. The estimates are computed by mul-
tiplying the average number of pigs raised per litter by 
the average number of sows farrowed from each group. 
The cost estimates are too aggregated to be of great 
value, but they do indicate variable proportions. Costs 
of production per hundredweight average $16.86 for the 
5- to l4-sow herds and $14.50 for the 55- to 64-sow en-
terprises, a difference of $2.36. 
The cost estimates indicate that neither a 100-hog nor 
a 200-hog yearly payment limit would encourage the 
most efficient size of enterprise. The lowest average costs 
per hundredweight are realized with about 60 sows or 
with sales of between 350 and 400 hogs from a single 
season's farrowings. 
The Purdue cost estimates indicate that it would re-
quire a considerably greater amount of resources to 
produce the nation's hogs if small-scale producers were 
induced to produce a greater percentage of the hogs. 
ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF PAYMENTS RESTRICTED 
TO MARKETING QUOTAS 
In this part of the study, an alternative direct-pay-
ment program for hog producers is considered. Some of 
the effects of using marketing quotas for hog producers, 
with direct payments limited to quota marketings, are 
estimated. The objective of the program is to provide the 
nation's hog producers with a measure of income se-
curity by making direct payments on the number of 
hogs needed to provide a stable future pork supply when-
ever the yearly average price falls below a preset "sup-
port" level. 
The difference between a program which would limit 
direct payments to quotas instead of to a uniform num-
ber (such as 100 or 200 hogs per producer) is that, under 
the quota system, payments would be made on a uniform 
percentage of each producers' previous sales -- say, 90 
percent. 
Marketing quotas to date have been used for milk 
and for controlling crop production. The producers of all 
of the basic commodities have been subject to acreage 
allotments. The quota marketing of these producers was 
the production from their acreage allotments. Penalities 
of varying sizes have been imposed on marketings in 
excess of quotas. 
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A direct-payment program that would allow direct 
payments for the quota marketings of hog producers 
could take different forms. Payments could be limited 
to quota allotments and penalties imposed for market· 
ings in excess of quotas. Rigid supply adjustment could 
be incorporated if the penalties for excessive marketings 
were large. Several problems, however, could arise if this 
procedure were followed. 
Hogs, unlike wheat or cotton, cannot be stored until 
the next year without a change in form. Producers can 
only estimate the number of barrows and gilts that will be 
marketed from the sows they intend to farrow. Produc-
ers would have only a few alternatives if their production 
was in excess of the number they could market under 
their individual quotas. A greater number of hogs could 
be consumed on the farm_ Increased farm consumption, 
however, would provide only a limited additional out-
let. Hogs that could not be marketed under the quota 
could be retained for breeding stock for the next year. 
Hogs that could not be more profitably disposed of could 
be sold subject to the penalty. 
A direct· payment program could be established with 
the stipulation that payments would be made for only 
the hogs sold under the quotas, with no penalties for 
marketings in excess of quotas. Producers could then mar-
ket hogs in excess of their quotas if their cost structures 
permitted. This type of program receives primary con-
sideration in the following study. 
Announcement of the Quota 
The government would have to determine the na-
tional quota about a year in advance if producers were 
to be given a chance to adjust production to comply with 
their individual quotas. It would probably require a month 
for the government to determine and inform producers 
of their individual quotas after the determination of the 
national quotas. Quotas would have to be announced to 
producers at least 11 months in advance, since the ges-
tation period of the sow is about 4 months, and growing 
and finishing of the barrows and gilts would require ap-
proximately 7 months. 
The intent of the quota program is to let the open-
market price prevail. Then the government will make up 
the difference between the support price and the open-
market price with a direct payment on the predetermined 
individual quotas. However, a problem arises when the 
question of how to establish a national quota is raised. 
If a national production quota is established to provide 
a stable future pork supply, time becomes an important 
factor. Producers must know their quotas at least 11 
months in advance to adjust farrowing to comply with 
these quotas. Therefore, pork supplies for, the period 
in which the quotas apply would have to be estimated 
on the basis of statistics available about a year in ad-
vance of the time when the quotas are in effect. 
Methods and Assumptions Used in Establishing 
the Hypothetical System of QUotas 
A hypothetical system of quotas is established to apply 
to 1959 United States hog marketings. For simplicity, 
estimates of the effects of these quotas are made on an 
aggregated regional basis. 
The methods and assumptions used in establishing the 
quotas are: 
(a) The quotas apply to all hogs. 
(b) The marketing period for which the quotas apply 
is Jan. 1, 1959, through Dec. 31, 1959. 
(c) Pork supplies for 1959 are estimated from pork 
supply and distribution data available at the end of 1957 
to simulate conditions that would have been encountered 
if a system of quotas had been in force at that time. 
(d) Estimated pork supplies for 1959, in pounds, are 
converted to a national marketing quota by dividing the 
pork-supplies figure by the average pork production per 
hog during a historical period. 
(e) The quotas are assumed to have been issued to 
producers by Feb. 1, 1958. 
(f) Quota allotments are issued on the basis of his-
torical marketings during a base period. As an alterna-
tive, a base period adjusted for regionallrends in market-
ings is used. 
Estimating 1959 Pork Supplies 
United States pork supplies for 1959 are estimated, 
with one exception, on the basis of statistics available at 
the end of 1957. The one exception is a population esti-
mate that would not have been available at that time 
but which could easily have been projected. 
The following formula is used to estimate total pork 
supplies for 1959: (Projected trend of civilian per-capita 
pork consumption X civilian population as estimated for 
July 1, 1959) + (estimated military requirements) + 
(estimated ending stocks) - (estimated net imports) -
(estimated beginning stocks) - (estimated farm slaugh-
ter) = total estimated 1959 pork supplies. 
The trend in per-capita pork consumption from 1946 
through 1957 is projected to 1959. The 1946 through 
1957 period is selected to approximately reflect recent 
consumption patterns. Denoting civilian per-capita pork 
consumption by Y and time by X, the regression equation 
used to project civilian per-capita pork consumption to 
1959 is: ,c, 
Y = 73.2366 - 0.8364X. 
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Fig. 5. Civilian consumption of pork per capita, 1946 through 1957, 
and the mathematically fitted trend line. 
The trend value, -0.8364 pound per capita per year, 
is significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level. 
Figure 5 shows pork consumption per capita from 1946 
through 1957 and the mathematically fitted trend line, 
A July 1, 1959, population estimate (43) is used to 
approximate the average population for the year. Mili-
tary requirements for pork during 1.959 are estimated, 
assuming continued peace with approximately the same 
number of people serving in the armed forces as in 1957. 
Therefore, the armed forces pork requirements for 1959 
are approximated by the 1957 figure (35, p. 285). 
Estimates of 1959 beginning and ending stocks, net 
imports and farm slaughter are simply the averages of 
these quantities for the 4-year period, 1954 through 1957 
(35). The magnitude of these quantities tends to show 
some variation according to the stages of the hog cycle. 
An average of these quantities over the previous hog 
cycle is used to approximate the magnitude of these 
quantities for 1959. . 
Upon substitution of the values into the equation, the 
estimated 1959 pork supplies = (61.53 pounds X 174,-
566,000) + (21.3 million pounds) + (336 million 
pounds) (35.25 million pounds) (369 million 
pounds) - (935.87 million pounds) = 9,949,1.52,282 
pounds. 
The 1959 pork supplies estimate is converted to a 
national marketing quota in terms of hog numbers by 
dividing by 134 pounds - the average production of 
pork, excluding lard, per hog commercially slaughtered 
during the 1.954 through 1957 period (35, p. 196). 
Average production of pork per hog is related to 
factors affecting the live weight of hogs marketed. Some 
of these factors are the supplies of feed grain available 
for fattening, the hog-corn ratio during the fattening 
period and the size of the current pig crop. An average 
of pork production per hog for the duration of a hog 
cycle (1954, through 1957) provides an estimate of what 
the average production of pork per hog might have been 
in 1959. 
Apportioning the Quotas 
The estimated national marketing quota for United 
States hog producers in 1959 is 74,274,405 hogs. This 
quota is first distributed among producers in the nine 
regions on the basis of historical marketings. The histori-
cal marketing base period is 1954 through 1957_ Average 
hog marketings over the period were 74,161,500 per 
year (40, 41, 4,2). The average marketings during the 
base period are 0.12 percent less than the estimated na-
tional quota for 1959. The consumption and supplies 
estimation procedure used to establish the quota results 
in a quota very near the average marketings over the 4· 
year hog cycle.6 
The 1954 through 1957 base period, used to apportion 
the quotas, began 5 years before the year for which the 
quotas apply. When quotas are assigned on the basis of 
marketings during a base period, producers are appor-
tioned quotas according to their relative marketings during 
this period. This system tends to project the geographical 
marketing patterns of the past into the future. A method 
of apportioning quotas to take marketing trends into 
6The nature and effects of the annual variations behind the 4.year 
cycle arc discussed later in this report. 
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account would adjust producer allotments to the changes 
in geographical marketing patterns. 
An as alternative basis for quota allocation, the 1954 
through 1957 marketing base is modified to estimate how 
quota allotments and direct payments by regions are af-
fected by including marketing trends. A modified base is 
computed for each region with a significant marketing 
trend. The modified base is computed by adding to, or 
subtracting from, the 1954-57 base the trend value in 
marketings to approximate the expected increase or de-
crease in marketings during 1958 and 1959, assuming a 
continuation of the 1946 through 1957 trends in regional 
hog marketings (39,40,41,42). For example, to compute 
the marketing base for producers in the Pacific region, 
2 X 25,790 or 51,580 hogs are subtracted from the 
1954-57 marketing base. The 51,580 hogs constitute the 
expected decrease in marketings during 1958 and 1959. 
In the regions where the marketing trends are not signifi-
cantly different from zero, the 1954 through 1957 base is 
again used to apportion the quotas. 
Producers in the regions with significant positive mar-
keting trends are allotted additional hogs under the modi-
fied base. Producers in the regions with insignificant or 
negative marketing trends are allotted fewer hogs after 
the reapportionment. 
Estimated Payments 
Estimates now are made of the payments that would 
have been made to producers under a direct-payment pro· 
gram for quota marketings in 1959. The magnitude of the 
payments would have been primarily dependent upon the 
level of the support price, the percent of producer partic-
ipation, and the percent of participating producers who 
would have marketed their full quota allotments. 
The support price used is 80 percent of the United 
States average price of hogs for the 10-year period, 1949 
through 1958 (35, 36). The payment procedure is similar 
to that used by the Canadians under their deficiency-pay-
ment program. A payment estimate is made assuming that 
the government would have made up to each producer, 
for his quota marketings, the difference between the 1959 
United States weighted-average market price and the 
support price. Additional assumptions made in the com-
putation of the payment estimates are: (a) there would 
be 100 percent producer participation; (b) each pro-
ducer would have marketed his full quota allotment; 
and (c) marketings would have been unaffected by the 
direct-payment program. The last assumption implies 
that producers simply would have taken their chances on 
the open market for marketings in excess of their quotas. 
The estimated weighted-average price of hogs in the 
United States was $14.07 per hundredweight in 1959. 
The hypothetical support price is $14.70 per hundred-
weight. The support price is 80 percent of the average 
price received by farmers for hogs from 1949 through 
1958. Payments would have been 63 cents per hundred· 
weight for all hogs sold under quotas. 
The procedure used to establish the national pork 
quota for 1959 and the procedure used for developing the 
support price are not entirely consistent. With the excep-
tion of the per-capita pork consumption estimate for 1959, 
which is based on the 1946 through 1957 trend, the bal-
ance of the components used in establishing the 1959 
national pork quota is based on the historical relation-
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ships in the 1954 through 1957 period. The support price, 
however, is set at a specific percentage of the average 
price received by farmers for hogs from 1949 through 
1958. 
In light of recent technological advances in hog pro-
duction, this inconsistency could generate built-in pres-
sures to maintain an economically unsound program. For 
example, the many small-scale producers might operate 
on a higher price and cost level than the few large-scale 
producers (3). The latter producers could pose a con-
stant threat to the small-scale producers. These possible 
treadmill effects would need to be considered when es-
tablishing the national pork quota and the support 
price because of the additional difficulties they could pose 
to the effective administration of such a program. 
However, for the purpose of comparison with the 
same type of support price used by the Canadians, 80 
percent of the 1949 through 1958 average price is used 
as the support price. Estimates are made of the total 
payments that would have been required for producers 
in each of the nine regions. In the estimation process, the 
simple average weight (36) of the hogs marketed within 
each region is multiplied by the difference between the 
support and the weighted-average market price. This pro-
vides an estimate of the average payment that would 
have been required for each hog marketed under quotas 
by producers in each region. Total regional payments 
are estimated by multiplying the average payment per hog 
by the estimated number of hogs eligible for direct 
payments from each region_ It was necessary to assume 
that the hogs marketed under the quotas would have 
had an average weight equal to the average for all hogs 
marketed within the regions. 
Estimates are made of the total payments that would 
have been required under both methods of apportioning 
the quotas. Regional payments in 1959, under the assumed 
payment procedures, would have been as indicated in 
table 7. 
The total payments would have been approximately 
the same, regardless of the method used to apportion 
the quotas. This is logical since the total number of hogs 
eligible for direct payment would have been the same 
for both allocation methods. Total payments would have 
been slightly greater if the 1954 through 1957 historical 
marketing base had been used to apportion the quotas. 
More of the heavier hogs from the West North-Central 
region would have been eligible for direct payments. 
Regional payments would have differed under the 
alternate methods of apportioning the quotas. Producers 
in the West North-Central region would have received 
a $1,135,551 greater payment if the 1954 through 1957 
historical marketing base had been used to apportion 
Table 7_ Regional payments and the percent of the total payment 
received by producers in each region under alternate 
methods of quota allocation. 1959. 
Payments. Percent Payments. Percent 
1954-57 of modified of 
Area base payment base payment (dollar.) (dollars) 
New England .........• 253,220 0.28 247,952 0.23 
Middle Atlantic ...... 1,326.515 1.21 1.388,206 1.27 
East North-Central 36.718,460 33.60 37,294.350 34.16 
West North·Central 54,594,551 49.96 53,459.000 48.!lfi 
South Atlantic ........ 5,824,316 5.33 6.228.374 5.71 
East South-Central 5,336.335 4.88 5,609,743 5.14 
West South-Central 3.226.641 2.95 3,159.527 2.89 
Mountain ................ 935.913 0.86 820.314 0.75 
Pacific ..................... 1,071,452 0.98 980,902 0.89 
Total ...................•.... 109,287,403 100.00 109,188.368 100.00 
the quotas. Payments for producers in the East North-
Central region would have been $575,890 greater under 
the modified base than under the 1954-57 historical mar-
keting base. 
Cost of Unlimited Payments 
Costs incurred under the quota program now are com-
pared with those for a direct-payment program for all 
hogs at the same rate of payment per hundredweight. The 
estimated cost by regions and for the United States 
of unlimited direct payments for all hogs marketed dur-
ing 1959 is shown in table 8. 
Producer participation in the program is assumed 
to be 100 percent. A 63-cents-per hundredweight direct 
payment is used to raise the $14.07 national average 
price received by farmers for hogs sold during 1959 
to the $] 4.70 support level. The unlimited payments 
are computed by multiplying the difference between 
the support and the market price of hogs by the total 
liveweight of hog marketings in each region in hundreds 
of pounds. 
Direct outlays for the unlimited payments would have 
been $124,425,316 and about 12 percent greater than the 
payments for the quota marketings. 
The Use of Quotas for Supply Control 
In the preceding program, direct payments are made 
only for the hogs needed to provide a stable future pork 
supply. Producers who marketed hogs in excess of their 
quotas simply received no direct payments for their excess 
marketings. 
A rigid supply control system of quotas would be very 
difficult to use effectively for hogs. A program that would 
allow producers to market only their quota allotments 
would probably necessitate the destruction of some of the 
over-quota production. Public resentment arose when 
this procedure was followed during the depression and 
probably would arise again if the practice were repeated. 
Even if the number of hogs marketed could be restricted 
to the quota, the program might not reduce greatly the 
total pork tonnage, since producers might be induced to 
market their hogs at heavier weights. 
An estimate of the possible effects of a rigid supply 
control measure can be made if the unrealistic assump-
tions are made that marketing weight would not have 
changed as a result of the program and that marketings 
could have been restricted to the quotas. The quota for 
1959 called for a reduction in numbers of ] 0,149,595 
below the actual marketings. If marketing weights would 
not have changed because of the program, total hog 
marketings would have been reduced by 23,750,052 hun-
rable 8. Estimated cost of unlimited direct payments for all hags 
marketed during 1959. 
Area 
New England ............................... . 
Middle Atlantic ......................... . 
East NOl1:h-Central ................... . 
West North-Central ................ .. 
South Atlantic .......................... .. 
East South-Central .................. .. 
West South-Central ................... . 
W~cifi~ai~ .... :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
United States ............................ .. 
Payment 
(dollars) 
272,242 
1,120,846 
40,670,135 
62,199.585 
7,317,261 
6,470.705 
3,864,653 
1,183,638 
1,326,251 
124,425,316 
Perc"nt of 
payment 
0.22 
0.90 
,.' 32.68 
.",;.,. 49.99 
5.88 
5.20 
3.11 
0.95 
1.07 
100.00 
Table 9. Actual 1959 and hypothetical quota marketings, prices and 
value of marketings. 
Marketings 
(hundreds 
of pounds) 
Actual 1959 ............ 197,500,500a 
Quota 1959 .............. 173,750,448 
Price per 
hundredweight (dollars) 
14.07 
18.80 
Value of 
marketings 
(dollars) 
2,778,832,035 
3,179,633,198 
aTaken from U. S. Department of Agriculture (86, p. 34). 
dredweight - a reduction of 12.03 percent (refer to table 
9) . 
An estimate of the elasticity of demand for hogs at 
the farm level, -0.4 (24,29, p. 19), is used to estimate 
the effect on hog prices that a 12,03-percent reduction in 
the quantity of marketings would have had during 1959. 
The figures in table 9 can be used to compare the actual 
value of the hog marketings during 1959 with the mar-
ketings called for under the restrictive quota. 
The value of the smaller quota marketings is 11.4 per-
cent greater than the actual value of hog marketings dur-
ing 1959. 
Effects of Marketing Quotas on Production Efficiency 
A program that would not penalize producers for 
marketing in excess of quotas probably would have little 
negative or positive effect on production efficiency. Some 
positive effect could be realized if the program provided 
a better basis for production planning than the open 
market. However, the program could not be expected 
to remove a great deal of price uncertainty from hog 
production, since with the annual payment procedure, 
producers would not know the size of the direct payment 
per hundredweight until the end of the year. 
A system of quotas could retard resource mobility in 
hog production. Small, inefficient producers might be in-
duced to remain in hog production as long as direct pay-
ments would be made for their quota allotments, A system 
of quotas, however, would not be as likely to encourage 
smaller enterprises as would a 100- or 200-hog limit. 
ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF PAYMENTS 
RESTRICTED TO LIGHTWEIGHT HOGS 
Direct payments on hogs could be restricted to light-
weight barrows and gilts, say from 180 to 200 pounds. If 
these direct payments on lightweight hogs induced mar-
ketings at lighter weights, the total tonnage going to mar-
ket would be reduced. This would increase hog prices and 
total returns as well, since the demand for hogs is in-
elastic. 
But a problem would arise. The price differentials 
between light and heavy hogs would change as the per-
centage of light hogs in the run increased. This would off-
set part or all of the direct payment. 
Under free-market conditions, the difference between 
the prices of different weights of hogs results from the 
relative supply and demand for hogs in the various 
weight groups, Making direct payments on 180-200 pound 
barrows and gilts would induce producers to market more 
of their hogs below 200 pounds. Then the price differen-
tials between the different weight groups would change. 
The prices of the lighter hogs would decline relative to 
the prices of heavier hogs. This would offset part of the 
direct payment on the lighter hogs. It also would reduce 
the inducement to market hogs at lighter weights. 
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Effects on 180-200 Pound Hogs 
If the direct payments on 180·200 pound barrows and 
gilts were large enough to induce farmers to market all 
of their barrows and gilts at or below 180·200 pounds, 
that would reduce the average weight of barrows and 
gilts from the 226 pounds that they averaged at eight 
markets combined, 1954.60, to about 190 pounds. This 
would reduce the total tonnage of barrows and gilts by 
about 15 percent. 
This reduction of total tonnage of pork probably would 
occur only in the short run. If this type of program con-
tinued over an extended period of time, farmers could ad-
just their production plans and send more hogs to market 
thus offsetting the drop in total tonnage achieved by 
lighter weight marketings. 
But the payment would have to be quite large to bring 
about this 15·percent reduction, for reasons given in the 
rest of this section. Figure 6 shows the relationship be-
tween two variables: (a) the ratio of the percentage of 
hogs marketed at 200 pounds and under to the percentage 
of 240·270 pound hogs marketed and (b) the price differ-
ential between 180·200 and 240-270 pound hogs for the 
4-year period, 1956·59."1 This period covers one full hog 
cycle. 
Using the 4·year average for Chicago, we find that, 
as the relative percentage of lightweight hogs in the reo 
ceipts increases, the price differential between the lighter 
and heavier weight groups decreases and then becomes 
negative (see fig. 6). During this period, an increase of 
one in the receipts ratio between light and heavy hogs 
is associated with about an aO·cent drop in the price dif· 
ferential. 
If a direct-payment plan for 180·200 pound hogs 
increased the number of hogs coming to market at 180· 
200 pounds, it would depress the relative price of 180· 
200 pound hogs at a rate of about 80 cents for an in· 
crease of one in the ratio. This would wipe out some of 
the effectiveness of the payments. 
Suppose, for example, that an increase of one in the 
ratio between light and heavy hogs resulted from a direct 
payment of $1 per 100 pounds on lightweight hogs. In 
this case, 80 cents of the $1 would be offset by the change 
in the market differential against it. 
The system, thus, would be self.equilibrating. To the 
extent that a payment for marketing hogs at lighter 
weights was successful - inducing marketings of more 
hogs at lighter weights - the relative price of the light. 
weight hogs would decrease and nullify part or perhaps 
all of the payment. Then the incentive to market hogs at 
lighter weights would decrease to a point where a new 
equilibrium would be reached. 
Effects of 4-year cycle 
The 4-year average shows that, as the percentage of 
lightweight hogs increases, the price differential between 
180·200 pound and 240·270 pound barrows and gilts 
declines or even becomes negative. It is possible that 
this relationship varies, depending on the total supply 
of barrows and gilts on the market. That is, it may vary 
depending on the stage of the hog cycle. Since this type 
'The data in figs. 6 through 9 are available in tabular form from 
the senior author. 
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ential between 180·200 and 240·270 pound hogs, at Chicago, monthly 
averages, 1956-59. 
of direct payment might be used only when supplies 
are large, it is desirable to determine whether the rela· 
tionship in short supply periods is different from that 
in large supply periods. 
Table 10 shows the salable receipts of all hogs at the 
12 major public stockyards, salable receipts of all hogs 
at Chicago, percent of barrows and gilts in the Chicago 
receipts and the salable receipts of barrows and gilts 
at Chicago for each of the years 1956·59. The effect of 
variation in total receipts on the relationship between 
ratios of percentage receipts and price differentials is 
shown in the diagrams in fig. 7. They show the relation-
ship separately by years, 1956 through 1959. 
Table 10. Salable receipts of all hags and barrows and gilts for Chi· 
cago and ather markets, 1956-59." 
1956 1957 1958 1969 
Salable receipts of 
all hog. for 12 
public stockyards (head) .................. 18,336,257 16,112,434 15,651.617 18,448,906 
Salable receipta of 
all hogs for 
Chicago (bead).. 2,416,102 2.028,739 2,073.594 2,234,920 
Approximate per-
centage barrows 
and gilts of all 
hogs at Chicago.. 83 83 "S6 86 
Salable receipta of 
barrows and gilts 
at Chicago (head) 
(row 2 times 
row 3) .................. 2,005,365 1,683,853 1,783,291 1,922.031 
aBaslc data from U. S. Department of Agriculture (36). 
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The regression is about $1 for 1956, 60 cents for 
1957,80 cents for 1958 and $1.10 for 1959. These results 
are reached by visual inspection of a straight line fitted 
free·hand to the dots. It could easily be argued that the 
relationship is curvilinear instead of linear. 
Comparison of these relationships with the receipts 
at Chicago for 1956·59 shows that the regression is high. 
er ($1 and $1.10) in the years of higher total receipts 
(1956 and 1959) than in the years of lower receipts 
(60 cents and 80 cents in 1957 and 1958). This is what 
one would logically expect, since, when receipts are low, 
buyers are forced to purchase "hogs in general," so to 
speak, with less regard for their weight than when sup· 
plies are heavier and when the buyers have an oppor· 
tunity to discriminate more carefully. The buyers alone 
are not the only ones responsible; consumers, and the 
rest of the marketing system, are also involved. 
Effects on 180·220 Pound Hogs 
On the average, only about 15 percent of the barrows 
and gilts marketed at Chicago weigh less than 200 pounds. 
About 40 percent weigh 220 pounds and under. The 
price differentials for 180-200 pound hogs are sensi· 
tive to even a small increase in their percentage of total 
receipts. What would happen if a broader - and perhaps 
less sensitive - weight "range were included for direct 
payments, for instance 180-220 pounds? 
Figure 8 presents the same relationship and covers 
the same period as fig. 6. But a broader weight range, 
180·220 rather than 180-200, is included for lightweight 
hogs, so the receipts ratio is between the percentage of 
hogs 220 pounds and under and the percentage of 240-
270 pound hogs in the receipts. 
With the broader range for lightweight hogs, an in· 
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crease of one in the receipts ratio is associated with only 
about a 30-cent decline in the price differential between 
the light and heavy hogs. 
Thus, direct payments on 180-220 pound hogs would 
not disturb market receipts and price relationships as 
much as payments on 180·200 pound hogs. There also 
would be, of course, less reduction in total weight of the 
hog slaughter. Payments on 180-220 pound hogs, could, 
at a maximum, reduce the total weight of hog slaughter 
about 6 percent in the short run - reducing the over-
all average weight of barrows and gilts from about 225 
pounds to nearer 210. 
Again this is a 4-year average approach. Inspection 
of years individually shows much the same result as in-
dicated for hogs under 200 pounds (see fig. 9). The reo 
gressions by years are about 40 cents in 1956, 15 cents 
in 1957, 30 cents in 1958 and 50 cents in 1959. This again 
shows the larger value of the regression coefficient for the 
two years of larger receipts. 
Determination of Most Profitable Marketing Weight 
Farmers have been urged to market their hogs below 
230 pounds, but many farmers feed them to weights 
beyond 230 pounds. Why? Do they make more money? 
If so, then why are farmers urged to market below 230 
pounds? Is this not asking the individual to sacrifice 
profits so that the group may benefit? Or would the de-
cline in total tonnage of pork raise hog prices enough 
to more than compensate the individual for losses of 
income that would have been received from selling at 
heavier weights? 
USDA research 
Atkinson and Klein (1) recorded some work done in 
12 experiments in five Corn Belt states. They state that 
"the feed-and.gain data from the 12 experiments showed 
that, as the weight of a hog increases, larger quantities 
of feed are consumed per unit of gain, but less than is 
generally recognized" (1, p. 22). 
Daily gain increases rather rapidly from date of 
weaning to t~e point at which a weight of more than 
100 pounds is reached; then the increase is a little more 
gradual, reaching a maximum of 1.71 pounds per day 
in the 200-210 pound weight range; but the daily gain 
is only 10 percent less at both 160 pounds and 300 pounds 
(see fig. 10) (1, p. 3). 
Atkinson and Klein used feed units to measure feed 
consumed at different weights. They defined "feed units" 
as a unit equal to 1 pound of corn in feeding value (1, 
p.8). 
When this criterion was used, they found that 10 per-
cent more feed is consumed per 100 pounds weight gain 
for the 225-275 pound hogs than for hogs up to 225 
pounds. Hogs marketed at the 200-pound level consume % 
of 1 percent less feed units per 100 pounds of liveweight 
than do hogs marketed at 225 pounds. Atkinson and 
Klein (1, pp. 8·9) state that hogs marketed at 250 pounds 
require I percent more feed units, that hogs at 275 pounds 
require 2 percent more feed units and that hogs at 300 
pounds require 3 percent more feed units per 100 pounds 
of liveweight than do the 225-pound hogs (refer to table 
11). 
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Estimates of most profitable marketing weights for ,. ~-: 
1955 throug~ .1958 using average yearly :rices . ~ 
In detennmmg the most profitable marketmg weIght, .; 
comparisons are made between the cost of keeping the 
hog for a given period and its increase in value during 
the period. Specifically, this is return over variable 
costs, hut, for the purpose of brevity, it will be referred 
Table 11. Feed consumption for specified gains in liveweight per 100 
pounds gain! 
Change in weight of 
butcher hog (pounds) 
200·225 ................................. . 
225·250 ................................. . 
250·275 .............. ~ .................. . 
275-300 ................................. . 
200-250 ................................. . 
225·275 ................................. . 
250-300 ................................ .. 
200·300 ................................. . 
Concentrates consumed per 100 pounds J(ain 
Index numbers 
(225.pound hog = 100) 
Feed units Pounds Feed units Pounds 
489 
506 
528 
652 
497 
517 
640 
519 
448 
470 
496 
623 
459 
483 
609 
484 
104.2 
108.0 
112.6 
117.8 
106.1 
110.3 
115.2 
110.6 
109.0 
114.3 
120.6 
127.3 
111.7 
117.4 
123.9 
117.8 
"Data from Atkinson and Klein (I, p. 8). 
to simply as "profit" in the following sections. The weight 
gains and amount of feed needed for those gains are taken 
from Atkinson and Klein's figures on feed consumption 
and weight gains (refer to table 12). These figures are 
adjusted to the United States Department of Agriculture 
weight classifications. To determine costs of feeding, a 
ration is formulated which includes corn, meat scraps 
and soybean meal in proportions that make up a 1O.per. 
cent protein feed. The 1955·58 average yearly feed prices 
(31) are used to determine the costs of feeding. From 
this, marginal costs are determined. Marginal revenues 
are determined by the use of average yearly hog prices 
(35, 36) for 1955-58 on the Chicago market; these are 
multipled by each of the weight groups. The difference 
between the values of the various weight groups constitutes 
the marginal returns. 
Using average yearly prices for hogs and feeds, the 
optimal (most profitable) marketing weight in 1955 
was about 240 pounds, since marginal cost exceeds 
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Table 12. Relationship of feed consumed by hogs after weaning to 
liveweight, measured both in feed units and in pounds of 
feed." 
Li\'eweight Feed consumed after weaning Rate of gain in IIvewcight 
per additional 100 pound. 
35 ............. . 
50 ............. . 
75 ............. . 
100 ............. . 
125 ........... . 
150 ............. . 
175 ............. . 
200 ............. . 
225 ............. . 
250 ............. . 
275 ............. . 
300... .......... . 
Feed units Pounds of feed in pounds 
o 
64.7 
172.8 
281.8 
392.1 
504.5 
619.5 
787.7 
859.8 
986.3 
1,118.3 
1,256.3 
o 
50.7 
137.5 
227.8 
321.7 
419.6 
521.7 
628.5 
740.6 
858.1 
982.0 
1.112.8 
29:3 
28.2 
27.2 
26.1 
25.0 
23.9 
22.9 
21.8 
20.7 
19.6 
18.6 
aData from Atkinson and Klein (1, p. 25). 
marginal revenue at the 270·pound level. This is shown 
in fig. n. 
In 1956, the optimal marketing weight was about 
270 pounds, because, at 300 pounds, marginal cost 
exceeded marginal revenue. In the years 1957 and 1958, 
the optimal marketing weight was beyond the 300.pound 
leveL 
The marginal revenue in all five weight groups was 
relatively low in 1955 and 1956, but it was relatively 
high in 1957 and increased even more in 1958. Marginal 
cost declined from 1955 through 1958; this can be ex· 
plained by lower feed prices. For example, soybean meal 
decreased from $4.33 per 100 pounds in 1955 to $4.14 
per 100 pounds in 1958 (refer to table 13) (34). So it 
is apparent that both effects were working in the same 
direction - marginal costs decreased, and marginal 
returns increased. This was true from year to year with 
the exception of 1958 when prices of feed grains increased 
again. 
In the above analysis, average yearly prices are used 
to determine optimal marketing weights. We will look at 
seasonal price variation to see what effect it has. Atkinson 
and Klein observed that, during 1930·41, the seasonal 
price pattern was quite stable except during periods of 
price control or when a sharp change occurred. This does 
not mean that price movements in any year will follow 
the seasonal pattern, but, over periods of 5, 10 or 20 
years, the seasonal changes are very similar (1, p. 10). 
However, it was found in this study that, during the 
period 1947·59, the seasonal price pattern did change. 
Price patterns for years 1930·41 are shown in table 14. 
Price patterns for years 1947·59 are shown in table 15, 
which is based on R. J. Foote's and Karl A. Fox's 1'20) 
article and on a bulletin by Breimeyer and Kause (5). 
For the period, 1947·59, highest prices occurred duro 
Table 13. Feed prices by years (in dollars).a 
Average yearly prices 
1955 
Corn No.3 yellowb (bu.hels).......... 1.35 
Soybean meal (hundredweight)...... 4.83 
Meat scrap. (hundredweight).......... 5.03 
1966 1957 
1.29 1.12 
4.01 3.80 
4.73 4.71 
aData from (31). 
bU. S. average price received by farmer. on 15th of month. 
1958 
1.07 
4.14 
5.80 
Table 14. Index numbers of Insonal variation in prices for 200·220 
pound good and choice barrows and gilts in Chicago for 
years 1930·41.a 
Month Index number Month Index numb~r 
Jan. ........................... 93.2 July............................ 109.0 
Feb. ........... ................ 97.4 Aug. ............................ 112.2 
Mar. ........... ................ 100.0 Sept. .......................... 112.9 
April .......................... 97.1 Oct. ............................ 100.7 
May........... ........ ....... 96.8 Nov. ........ ................ . 92.0 
June ............................ 100.3 Dec. 88.4 
"Data from Atkins"n and Klein (1, p. 10). 
Table 15. Index numbers of seasonal 'variation in prices for 180·200 pound, 200·220 pound, 220·240 pound, 240·270 pound good and choice 
(or U.S. No.1, 2 and 3) barrows and gilts at Chicago, 1947·59 average. 
Month Index. numbersa 
180·200 200·220 220·240 240·270 
Jan. .................... --.... 96.0 95.6 94.8 93.6 
Feb. ................ __ ........ 96.6 96.5 96.0 95.4 
March .... _--_ ................ 96.9 97.2 97.3 97.5 
April .......................... 97.4 97.6 97.6 97.7 
May ............................ 103.3 103.2 102.9 102.4 
June .........................• 107.9 107.7 107.4 106.5 
aPercentage of each weight group's moving average. 
ing June, July and August when marketings were light, 
while for the period, 1930.41, highest prices were at· 
tained during July, August and September. The price 
breaks in October when spring pigs are marketed, and for 
the period, 1947·49, it normally reached the low point 
for thc year in November. During the period, 1930·41, 
the low point was reached in December and occasionally 
in January. When the 1947·59 data are used, prices rise 
gradually through July, with no peak or low point reo 
alized in latc winter and early spring. Previously a late 
winter peak and an early spring low point were reo 
alized.s Atkinson and Klein (1, p. 10) indicate that duro 
ing 1930·41, a peak was reached in March and a low 
point was realized in April and May. On the average, hogs 
marketed in July, August and September, brought a price 
20 percent per hundredweight higher than the price for 
hogs sold in November, December and January. This 
was true for both periods, 1930·41 and 1947·59. 
Atkinson and Klein (1, p. 11) state that "normally 
hogs marketed within the marketing range, 200·240 
pounds, sell for higher prices than heavier or lighter 
weights." Atkinson and Klein show that price discounts 
for heavier hogs vary considerably from month to month. 
This also holds true for the period, 1947·59 (refer to 
table 15). Part of this results because price changes come 
first for the lightest hogs. The changes are delayed for 
heavy hogs. "Prices of lightweight barrows and gilts, 
in a normal year, nearly hit their peaks by July, and, by 
early fall, are declining fast. Prices of heavy barrows 
hold high longer and usually do not break sharply until 
October" (5, p. 13). The reason for the delayed price 
movements for heavier hogs is that more time is required 
8Breimeyer and Kause (5. p. 13) indicated that the prices for years 
1947·53 rose to a secondary peak about late winter and then declined 
briefly before substantial increases in the price of hogs occurred. 
Month Index numbersa 
180·200 200·220 220·240 240·270 
July . ........................... 110.2 110.4 llO.3 109.6 
Aug. . ......................... 107.5 10S.7 109.5 110.4 
Sept. . ...........•............. 102.3 103.4 104.6 106.3 
Oct. . ........................... 95.8 96.0 96.7 98.1 
Nov. . ......................... 90.7 90.1 90.1 90.5 
Dec. . ..•........................ 93.1 92.2 91.4 90.3 
for feeding them, thus causing marketings and price 
changes to appear later. 
Estimates of most profitable marketing weights for 
1957 and 1958 using average monthly prices 
To more fully take into account seasonal price vari· 
ations, marginal returns and marginal costs are com· 
puted by months for 1957 and 1958. On the basis of the 
data in table 16, it was profitable to carry hogs up 
to and above the 300·pound level for each of the months 
in 1957. In 1958, it was again profitable to carry hogs up 
to and beyond the 300.pound level for each month ex· 
cept December. In December, marginal cost exceeded 
marginal revenue at the 240·270 pound weight group; 
therefore, the optimal marketing weight was 240 pounds. 
The data show that marginal revenue fluctuales con· 
siderably more by months than does marginal cost. The 
reason for this is that the prices of feed do not fluctuate 
as much during the year as do hog prices. 
As for variation of marginal revenue, between months 
in 1957, the 180-200 pound weight group shows a margi· 
nal revenue of $7.74 in August and $5.24 in January. 
This is a difference of $2.50. In the 200·220 pound clas· 
sification, marginal revenue ranges from $5.76 in August 
to $3.72 in January, a differential of $2.04. In the 220· 
240 pound classification, marginal revenue ranges from a 
high in August of $4.60 to a low in November of $3.31, 
a differential of $1.29. In the 240·270 pound elassifica· 
lion, the high marginal revenue is $6.33 in August, the 
low is $4.09 in December and May. The greatest dif· 
ferential in marginal cost is at the 270-300 pound weight 
group which shows a difference of 50 cents from January 
through December. The results in 1958 are similar as 
shown in table 16. ' 
If marginal revenues and marginal costs were com· 
Table 16. Marginal returns and marginal costs for various hog weight·groups by months for years 1957 and 1958 (in dollars). 
Month 
and 
year 
1957 
Jan ................................. .. 
Feb .................................. . 
March ........................... . 
April ............................... . 
May ................................. . 
June ........ __ ................... _ .. 
July ............................... . 
Aug ................................ . 
Sept ................................ . 
Oct .................................. . 
Nov ............................... .. 
Dec .................................. . 
1958 
Jan . ................................. . 
Feb .................................. . 
March ............................ .. 
April ............................... . 
May ................................. . 
June .............................. .. 
July ................................. . 
Aug ................................ . 
Sept ............................... .. 
Oct ................................. .. 
Nov ................................ . 
Dec .................................. . 
180·200 lb •. 200·220 lb •. 
MR Me MR Me 
5.24 2.19 3.72 2.27 
5.43 2.11 4.08 2.19 
5.61 2.12 4.20 2.20 
5.89 2.13 4.31 2.21 
5.99 2.18 4.19 2.26 
6.15 2.16 4.70 2.24 
6.76 2.18 5.20 2.27 
7.74 2.15 5.76 2.24 
7.22 2.08 5.00 2.17 
5.19 1.99 4.13 2.07 
5.43 1.93 3.77 2.01 
5.71 1.92 4.13 1.99 
5.87 1.86 4.22 1.93 
6.21 1.89 4.73 1.96 
6.75 1.96 5.05 2.04 
6.93 2.16 4.86 2.25 
6.77 2.20 4.79 2.28 
6.72 2.24 5.22 2.33 
6.93 2.25 5.44 2.34 
6.71 2.27 5.07 2.37 
6.09 2.15 4.76 2.24 
5.37 1.98 4.10 2.06 
5.07 1.92 3.57 2.00 
2.00 3.50 2.08 
220·240 lb •. 240·270 lbs. 
MR Me MR Me 
3.32 2.37 4.34 3.74 
3.40 2.29 4.26 3.61 
3.47 2.29 4.55 3.62 
3.57 2.31 4.57 3.64 
3.35 2.36 4.09 3.72 
3.53 2.34 4.32 3.69 
4.21 2.36 5.46 3.73 
4.60 2.33 6.33 3.68 
4.28 2.26 6.04 3.57 
3.50 2.16 4.99 3.40 
3.31 2.10 4.34 3.31 
3.35 2.08 4.09 3.28 
3.41 2.02 4.22 3.18 
3.87 2.05 5.05 3.23 
4.28 2.13 5.65 3.36 
3.86 2.34 4.96 3.70 
4.18 2.38 5.32 3.76 
4.35 2.43 5.41 3.84 
4.G6 2.44 6.32 3.85 
4.48 2.47 6.51 3.90 
4.22 2.34 5.92 3.69 
3.72 2.15 5.22 3.39 
3.18 2.08 4.40 3.29 
3.0S 2.17 3.21 3.43 
270-300 lbs. 
MR Me 
4.27 
4.41 
4.41 
4.52 
4.21 
4.21 
4.69 
5.37 
5:06 
3.56 
3.77 
4.75 
5.32 
4.81 
4.77 
5.10 
0.47 
5.68 
5.00 
5.14 
4.43 
3.53 
4.00 
3.86 
3.S7 
3.89 
3.98 
3.94 
3.99 
3.94 
3.82 
3.64 
3.54 
3.50 
3.40 
3.46 
3.59 
3.96 
4.02 
4.11 
4.13 
4.17 
3.95 
3.63 
3.52 
3.67 
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puted for each month in 1955 and 1956, the data prob-
ably would show that it would be unprofitable to go be-
yond 270 pounds and, in some months, even unprofit-
able to go beyond 240 pounds. It appears that there is a 
positive correlation between high hog prices and increased 
optimal marketing weights. Marginal costs have been 
steadily declining since 1955, and this had some effect. 
The effect of the decreasing marginal cost, however, was 
less than the effect of the increasing marginal revenue in 
this case. 
The following conclusions by Atkinson and Klein 
(I, p. 12) also apply to some of the results in table 15 
obtained from this direct-payment study: The farmer 
must take his choice between marketing a 200-pound hog 
at a specific time or marketing the hog at 250 pounds 
a month later. He must consider price discounts and sea-
sonal movements to determine the advantage of either 
weight in terms of profit. For the 13-year period, 1947-59, 
early spring pigs farrowed in February and March 
could be marketed more favorably at 200 pounds than at 
260 pounds and above. Pigs farrowed in April, the peak 
spring farrowing month, have little or no discounts for 
heavier weights, whereas the May and June pigs actually 
bring higher prices at weights of 240 and 270 pounds than 
at 200 pounds. 
For the period, 1930-4.1, July may be considered a 
transitional month. Pigs farrowed earlier could be kept 
to heavier weights and could be sold at higher prices, bUl 
the pigs farrowed in July, although they bring about the 
same price at 240 pounds as at 200 pounds, are dis-
counted at heavier weights. For the period 1947-59, pigs 
farrowed later in July could be profitably carried to 
heavier weights (refer to table 15). For pigs farrowed 
in September, the peak fall farrowing month, the hogs 
carried beyond 240 pounds brought a higher price than 
those at 200 pounds. The September pigs, during the 
period 1947-59, could be carried profitably to heavier 
weights. "There is a premium on heavy marketing weights 
for October pigs which sell at higher prices each month 
up to 300 pounds; whereas, November pigs bring 
slightly higher prices at 250 pounds than at heavier 
weights" (1, pp. 12-14.). For the period 194.7-59, the No-
vember pigs farrowed earlier in the month could be 
carried profitably to 240 pounds, but for pigs farrowed 
later in the month, the 270-pound hogs had the profit-
ability advantage over the 240-pound hogs. 
"There is a discount on heavier weights of pigs far-
rowed in December, and, in the months following, this 
discount grows larger" (1, p. 14). Therefore, timeliness 
of farrowing is quite important in determining the profit-
able weight at which to market hogs. 
The optimum marketing weights calculated for prior 
years in this and later sections are those at which any 
individual average producer could have maximized re-
turns. If all producers had marketed at these optimum 
weights, then the price. supply relationship would have 
changed and, with it, the optimum marketing weights. 
Estimated Cost of Direct Payments 
for Lightweight Hogs 
What would a program cost to induce farmers to sell 
their hogs at lighter weights? This cost would depend, 
first, on the size of the payment necessary to induce 
farmers to market their hogs at lighter weights. This 
payment would have to be at least as large as the profits9 
that farmers would forego by selling their hogs at lighter 
weights; so the first step is to estimate what those profits 
are. Profit is equal to total revenue minus total cost, so 
it is necessary to determine both total revenue and total 
cost. 
Estimates of profits based on weekly price 
data with one farrowing date 
Since there is a considerable amount of variation in 
hog prices from year to year and even from week to week, 
marginal returns for hogs 180 to 300 pounds, using a 
10-pound interval, are computed for a 10-year period, 
1949 through 1958 (refer to table 17). Weekly Chicago 
market prices (32) of U.S. Number 1, 2 and 3 grade 
barrows and gilts are used to compute the total returns 
on hogs. April 15 is chosen as the farrowing date. On 
the basis of Atkinson and Klein's (1) work and also 
Beneke's (4) suggestion, a gain of 1.25 pounds per day 
is used for all weights from 180 to 300 pounds. It is 
possible then to determine at what time period hogs 
reach different weights. The hogs farrowed April 15 are 
assumed to weigh 180 pounds on Nov. 1, 20:) pounds on 
Nov. 15, etc. Actual hog and feed prices are used for these 
specific time periods. 
A risk factor (i.e., the risk of losses beyond 200 
pounds) also is included in the computation of marginal 
revenues. According to Speer (30) the risk could be about 
Y2 of 1 percent for the weights that are considered. This 
was found to be insignificant; that is, it did not affect the 
results. 
Results show that there is considerable variation in 
marginal returns from year to year; in several cases 
there actually are negative marginal returns. For ex-
ample, for the weight group of 250-260 pounds, during 
9 As in the preceding section where yearly and monthly prices are 
used. this payment is the return over variable costs, but to be concise, it 
is referred to as "profit." 
Table 17. Marginal revenues using weekly Chicago market prices and a 10-pound interval for years 1949-58 with the farrowing date on April 
15 (in dollars}.a 
Date: 11/1 11/7 11/15 11/23 
11/7 11/15 11/23 12/1 
12/1 12/9 12/17 12/25 1/3 1/11 1/19 1/27 
12/9 12/17 12/25 1/3 1/11 1/19 1/27 2/5 
Year 
Weight 180- 190- 200- 210-
190 200 210 220 
220- 230- 240- 250- 260- 270- 280- 290-
230 240 250 260 270 280 290 300 
1949 ............................................ 0.74 0.55 1.64 0.83 
1950 ............................................ 1.08 0.81 1.56 1.79 
1951 ............................................ 0.78 0.90 2.50 1.24 
1952 ............................................ 2.33 0.79 0.90 1.29 
1953 ............................................ 2.07 2.80 5.21 4.65 
1.17 0.45 1.95 1.29 -0.14 2_37 3.58 3.62 
2.14 4.63 4.41 2.40 0.80 2.29 2.79 6.33 
1.07 0.62 2.49 1.28 -0.25 1.57 1.90 1.58 
1.39 1.13 4.85 1.53 1.65 3.34 1.80 2.26 
2.86 2.76 4.38 1.51 4.14 3.32 4.13 1.81 
1954.. .......................................... 2.71 1.56 0.93 0.59 
1955 ............................................ 0.49 -0.33 -0.03 -0.05 
1956 ........ _ ................................... 2.01 0_83 2.96 2.17 
1957 ............................................ -1.03 2.88 1.88 3_24 
1.44 -1.65 2.59 0.54 0.26 1.80 1.47 0.95 
0.52 -1.42 2.88 0.58 0_08 1.44 5.97 1.23 
5.11 0.62 2.72 1.44 0.89 4.53 1.84 -0.05 
3.63 1.19 3.81 -1.23 1.35 4.63 0.74 2.64 
1958 ................................. _ .......... 2.26 2.11 1.46 0.61 2.23 -0.13 2.50 -1.47 1.03 
"Adjusted for a risk factor of 'I. of 1 percent. 
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Table 18. Marginal costs using monthly U. S. prices of feed and a HI.pound interval for years 1949·58 with the farrowing date on April 15 
(in dollars)" . 
Date: 11/1 11/7 11/15 11/23 
11/7 11/15 11/23 12/1 
Year 
Weight: 180· 190. 200· 210· 
190 200 210 220 
1949 ............................................ 1.44 1.44 1.51 1.68 
1950 ............................................ 1.42 1.42 1.49 1.54 
1961.. .......................................... 1.66 1.56 1.64 1.68 
1952 ............................................ 1.87 1.37 1.43 1.49 
1953 ............................................ 1.31 1.31 1.38 1.41 
1954 ............................................ 1.21 1.22 1.27 1.32 
1965 ............................................ 0.97 0.98 1.03 1.06 
1966 ............................................ 1.04 1.05 1.10 1.10 
1957 ............................................ 1.00 1.02 1.07 1.06 
1958 ............................................ 1.01 1.01 1.06 1.11 
"Marginal costs include feed costs and interest On investment. 
the period Dec. 25, 1958, to Jan. 3, 1959, the marginal 
return is -$1.47 (refer to table 17). 
Monthly prices are used to compute marginal costs 
(31, 34). For purposes of this study, fixed costs such as 
depreciation and interest on equipment and shelter need 
not be considered. These costs have already been in· 
curred and, thus, would not determine at what weights 
the hogs should be marketed. At the suggestion of 
Beneke (4), interest on investment is included in marginal 
cost. An interest rate of 5 percent per annum is used. The 
interest on investment (to be added to marginal cost) 
for 1949·58, using an April 15 farrowing date, ranges 
from $0.03 for the lightweight hogs to $0.07 for the 
heavy. Marginal costs, including interest on investment, 
for 1949·58, using an April 15 farrowing date, are 
shown in table 18. 
The marginal costs are computed on a monthly basis 
since the variations in feed prices are negligible from 
week to week. The data in fig. 12 show that there is little 
va ration in marginal costs from time to time; the line 
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Fig. 12. Marginal revenues and marginal costs using a farrowing date 
of April 15 and a 10·pound interval, 1954 data. 
12/1 
12/9 
220· 
280 
1.60 
1.66 
1.70 
1.61 
1.43 
1.34 
1.07 
1.12 
1.07 
1.12 
12/9 12/17 12/25 1/3 1/11 1/19 1/27 
12/17 12/25 1/3 1/11 1/19 1/27 2/5 
230· 240· 250· 260· 270· 280· 290· 
240 250 260 270 280 290 300 
1.66 1.67 1.70 1.79 1.80 1.88 1.90 
1.62 1.63 1.63 1.72 1.72 1.80 1.76 
1.76 1.77 1.75 1.85 1.86 1.94 1.90 
1.57 1.58 1.57 1.64 1.66 1.74 1.73 
1.49 1.50 1.60 1.58 1.59 1.67 1.67 
1.38 1.39 1.39 1.46 1.46 1.67 1.55 
1.11 1.12 1.14 1.19 1.21 1.27 1.28 
1.17 1.18 1.29 1.34 1.87 1.42 1.38 
1.10 1.11 1.12 1.16 1.18 1.23 1.25 
1.17 1.19 1.18 1.23 1.26 1.30 1.81 
representing marginal costs appears to be either straight 
or gently sloped. 
The weekly data show several intersections of margi. 
nal revenue and marginal cost. The reason is that the 
hog prices vary a great deal from week to week. For 
example, if one looks at fig. 12 for 1954, when a 10-
pound interval is used, the April 15 farrowing date 
shows intersections between the weight groups of 190· 
200 and 200·210, between 210·220 and 220-230, etc. 
There are six intersections altogether. Each intersection 
of the marginal revenue and marginal cost lines represents 
one optimal marketing weight. 
Profits (incentive payments) are computed from 200 
pounds liveweight upward. Since there are usually sev· 
eral profitable weights above 200 pounds at which farm-
ers could market their hogs, the marketing weight for 
which the farmer receives the greatest amount of profit 
is the one chosen for calculation of the incentive pay-
ments. The incentive payments must at least be equal to 
the profit made beyond 200 pounds to induce farmers 
to market their hogs at lighter weights. Using the April 
15 farrowing date, the incentive payments that are needed 
are presented in table 19. The size of these payments 
varies from no payment for 1954 and 1955 to $19.55 per 
hog in 1953. 
Estimates of profits based on weekly 
price data with 12 farrowing dates 
Beneke (4) suggested that, to determine the total cost 
of the program with acceptable precision, it would be 
advisable to choose at least 12 farrowing dates. These 
are chosen to be on the 15th day of each month of the 
year for a 4-year period, beginning at Jan. 15, 1955, and 
ending at Dec. 15, 1958. 
In determining profits and incentive payments, the 
hogs farrowed Jan. 15 are assumed to weigh about 180 
pounds each on Aug. 1; they are assumed to weigh about 
200 pounds each on Aug. 15 and 220 pounds each near 
Table 19. Incentive payments per hog computed on a weekly basis 
with a 10·pound interval and an April 15 farrowing date. 
for years 1950·58 (in dollars).··b 
Year Payment per hog 
1950 ............................................................................... 12.67 
1951 ................................................................................ 0.86 
1952 ................................................................................ 4.22 
1953 ................................ _ .. _ ............................................ 19.55 
1954................................................................................ 0 
1965 ................... _............................................................ 0 
1956 ................................................................................ 11.19 
1957 ..... _ .......................................................................... 10.53 
1958 ................................................................................ 1.02 
'Incentive payments = :£ marginal revenue - :£ marginal costs from 
200 pounds to the optimal marketing weight for which the farmer receives 
the greatest amount of profit. 
'Payments for marketing at 200 pounds or below. 
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the end of August. The total values of the hogs are com-
puted from 200 pounds upward to 300 pounds, and 
marginal revenues are computed from these. Three dif-
ferent types of hog prices are used: (a) actual prices, 
(b) a fixed price and (c) moving-average prices. The mar-
ginal costs are computed on a monthly basis, and the 
optimal marketing weights are again determined. 10 
The incentive payments are equal to the sum of the 
marginal revenues for each lO-pound interval minus 
the sum of the marginal costs for each 10-pound interval 
from 200 pounds up to the optimal marketing weight. 
Again, there are usually several profitable marketing 
weights above 200 pounds, and the weight for which 
the farmer receives the greatest amount of profit is the one 
chosen for calculation of the incentive payments. These 
are the payments which appear in figs. 13 through 15. 
The incentive payments for the hogs farrowed Ian. 15 
appear on Aug. 15, while the incentive payments for 
hogs farrowed Feb. 15 appear on Sept. 15, etc. The reason 
the payments appear this way is that the farmer receives 
his payment at the time the hogs reach 200 pounds 
rather than at farrowing time. As a result, there are no 
incentive payments for the first 7 months of 1955 or the 
last 5 months of 1959. Figures 13 through 15 show the 
relative size of the incentive payments in different years. 
10The marginal costs. total values, marginal revenues and incentive 
payments, using all three types of hog prices, are available from the 
senior author~ 
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terval; payments for marketing at 200 pounds or below for years 
1955·59. 
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These payments also are used to compute the total cost of 
the program to the government. 
When actual weekly Chicago prices (32) for U.S. 
Number 1, 2 and 3 grade barrows and gilts are used, the 
incentive payments per hog range from $0 to $15.84. 
However, the payments are not consistent; in other words, 
the payment in a particular month may be high one year 
and very low for the same month the next year. This is 
illustrated in fig. 13 where, for the month of May, the 
incentive payment in 1957 is $15.84, but, for the same 
month in 1956, it is only $2.27. The cyclic fluctuation 
may have caused the inconsistency of the size of incen-
tive payments from year to year. The seasonal fluctua-
tion, too, has an effect on size of payments, but this may 
well be overshadowed by the cyclic fluctuation. The 
general variation with actual prices is as follows: The 
size of payment is fairly high in January, it rises in the 
following months and reaches its peak in March, April or 
May. Then it declines, reaching the low point usually in 
August or September. 
In addition to using actual prices, a fixed price also 
is used to determine incentive payments and cost of the 
program. This price is derived by averaging weighted 
average Chicago prices of U.S. Number 1, 2 and 3 grade 
barrows and gilts (35,36) over the 5-year period, 1955-
59. When the fixed price of $16.18 per hundredweight 
is used, there are usually one or two optimal marketing 
weights, rather than three or four as is true when the 
actual prices are used. The optimal (maximum profit) 
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Fig. 14. Incentive payments using a fixed price of $16.18 per hun· 
dredweight with a 10.pound interval; payments for marketing at 200 
pounds or below for years 1955-59. 
marketing weight under these conditions is usually 280 
or 300 pounds, and the incentive payments range from 
$2.35 to $4.83. The payments are above $2.50 for most 
periods (see fig. 14). The variation in the size of in· 
centive payments is relatively small when compared with 
the variation in the size of incentive payments when 
either actual prices or moving.average prices are used. 
In 1957, the payment is $3.56 on Jan. 15; it declines 
to a low of $3.30 on May 15 and rises to its highest 
point of $4.83 on Nov. 15. The variation in the size of 
the incentive payments is caused by a movement in feed 
costs (31). The other years, especially 1956 and 1958, 
had more variation in the size of incentive payments. 
For example, the 1956 payments vary from $4.83 on 
lan. 15 to $2.35 on June 15, while the 1958 payments 
vary from $4.46 on Jan. 15 to $2.71 on May 15. Even 
though there is a similarity in the variation in the size 
of the incentive payments, there is a difference in the 
time the payments reach their peaks. In 1955, the peak 
in the size of the incentive payments is attained on Oct. 
15; in 1956, it is reached on Jan. 15; in 1957, it is reached 
on Nov. 15; and in 1958, it is reached on Jan. 15. 
Table 20. Moving·average hog prices, 1955·59 (in dollars).· 
Dates 
180-200 200-220 220·240 240·270 270·300 
12/31.1/7 .............. 16.98 16.92 16.65 15.93 15.41 
1/7·1/14.. .............. 17.00 16.95 16.65 15.94 15.27 
1/14-1/22 .............. 17.08 16.97 16.67 16.14 15.55 
1/22-1/29 .............. 17.38 17.33 17.14 16.47 15.86 
1/29·2/2 ................ 17.23 17.30 17.15 16.54 16.11 
2/2-2/9 .................. 17.21 17.26 17.10 16.51 16.20 
2/9-2/15 ................ 16.86 16.99 16.85 16.35 16.03 
2/15-2/23 .............. 16.54 16.70 16.61 16.16 15.98 
2/23-3/2 ................ 16.14 16.36 16.29 15.92 15.83 
3/2-3/9 .................. 16.21 16.45 16.38 16.10 15.S9 
3/9·3/16 ................ 16.39 16.61 16.57 16.27 16.05 
3/16.3/30 .............. 16.89 17.12 17.09 16.82 16.66 
3/30-4/6 ................ 17.48 17.70 17.66 17.44 17.34 
4/6.4/13 ................ 17.73 17.83 17.73 17.45 17.47 
4/13·4/20 .............. 17.69 17.97 17.87 17.53 17.S1 
4/20-4/27 .............. 17.66 17.89 17.79 17.43 17.31 
4/27-5/4 ................ 17.49 17.72 17.59 17.21 17.02 
5/4.5/11 ................ 17.59 17.S9 17.63 17.17 17.03 
5/11-5/1S .............. 17.93 18.11 17.91 17.S2 17.29 
5/18·5/25 .............. 18.36 18.56 18.35 17.84 17.S2 
5/25-6/1.. .............. 18.94 19.13 18.90 lS.34 18.30 
6/1-6/S .................. 19.28 19.41 19.27 18.78 lS.72 
6/S-6/1S ................ 19.21 19.40 19.18 18.56 lS.10 
6/15-6/22 .............. 19.31 19.50 19.2S 18.64 18.74 
6/22-6/29 .............. 19.70 19.87 19.69 19.15 19.20 
6/29·7/6 ................ 19.47 19.71 19.63 19.04 19.19 
7/6-7/13 ................ 19.22 19.67 19.55 20.00 19.35 
7/13·7/20 .............. 19.04 19.56 19.30 19.84 19.31 
7/20-7/27 .............. 18.56 18.91 18.81 19.62 19.17 
7/27-S/3 ................ lS.41 18.80 18.78 19.74 19.28 
8/3-8/10 ................ 18.25 18.73 lS.80 19.6S 19.25 
8/10·8/17 .............. 17.94 18.44 18.48 19.33 lS.96 
S/17·8/24 .............. 17.82 18.20 18.32 19.16 18.81 
8/24.8/31 .............. 17.81 18.16 lS.26 19.02 IS.72 
8/31·9/7 ................ 17.51 17.87 17.99 18.S0 18.59 
9/7·9/14.. .............. 17.15 17.56 17.66 lS.51 17.56 
9/14.9/21 .............. 16.55 17.31 17.37 18.14 17.63 
9/21-9/2S .............. 16.69 16.97 17.06 lS.13 17.57 
9/2S-10/5 .............. 16.92 17.19 17.22 lS.01 17.69 
10/5-10/12 ............ 16.47 16.72 16.77 17.55 17.20 
10/12.10/19 .......... 16.20 16.38 16.39 17.16 17.02 
10/19-10/26 .......... 15.90 16.13 16.13 16.75 16.53 
10/26.11/2... ......... 15.89 16.03 15.99 16.48 16.24 
11/2-11/9 .............. 15.61 15.69 15.63 16.06 15.68 
11/9-11/16 ............ 15.57 15.64 15.56 15.85 15.28 
11/16-11/23 .......... 15.62 15.65 15.50 15.79 15.55 
11/23-11/30 .......... 15.28 15.2S 15.09 15.28 15.02 
11/30.12/7 ............ 15.46 15.52 15.27 15.35 14.99 
12/7·12114.. .......... 15.48 15.54 15.31 14.74 16.02 
12/14.12/21 .......... 15.74 15.74 15.47 14.S4 15.07 
12/21-12/28 .......... 16.03 16.01 15.70 15.04 15.41 
12/2S-1/2... ........... 15.11 15.12 14.83 14.07 14.49 
aThe moving average prices are derived by averaging Chicago prices 
for U. S. No. I, 2 and 3 barrows and gilts by week. over the 5-year 
period, 1955·59. Data from U. S. Department of Agriculture (32). 
The moving.average prices are derived by averaging 
Chicago prices for U.S. Number 1, 2 and 3 grade bar-
rows and gilts by weeks over the 5-year period, 1955·59 
(32). These prices are presented in table 20. The same 
5·year period is used to determine the moving.average 
prices by weeks as is used to determine the fixed price 
of $16.18. Therefore, it is possible to compare the size 
of the incentive payments and total costs of the program 
derived by use of the moving-average prices with those 
derived by use of the fixed price and actual prices. In 
addition, moving.average prices are used to reduce the 
effects of cyclic fluctuations and any other economic oc· 
currences such as a war or a threat of war. 
With moving·average prices, instead of having many 
sharp fluctuations in hog prices which could cause unu· 
sual profits in some periods, there is a smoothing·out 
effect; thus, profits maintain normality. Because the 
effects of cyclic fluctuation are reduced with moving· 
average prices, the variation in the size of incentive pay· 
ments also is reduced. The incentive payments using 
moving-average prices range from $0.95 to $9.32 (see 
fig. 15). 
There is more consistency in the size of the payments 
when moving·average prices are used. The general pat. 
tern shows that the incentive payments are fairly high 
early in the year, about $6, then increase even more and 
reach a peak of about $9 on April 15 of each year. Fol· 
lowing this, there is a general decline, reaching a low of 
about $1 on Sept. 15, and then an increa.se to Nov. 15 
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and another decline at the end of the year. This var· 
iation is caused primarily by seasonal fluctuation in hog 
prices. 
Estimates of total cost of the program 
The cost of a direct-payment program restricted to 
lightweight hogs would depend mostly on two things: 
(a) the percentage of barrows and gilts desired to be 
marketed at 200 or 220 pounds and less and (b) the 
precise effect that the increase in lightweight hogs would 
have on the price differentials between weight groups. 
With no past market situations involving a very large 
percentage of lightweight hogs, it is virtually impos-
sible to estimate accurately what would happen to the 
price differentials. 
We can, however, estimate the initial cost of the pro-
gram for commercial barrow and gilt slaughter, includ-
ing plants with and without federal inspection. The addi-
tional cost resulting from an increase in the amount of 
lighter hogs marketed after payments begin is not in-
cluded. We can only estimate the fir,st cost, assuming di-
rect payments with no effect on the weight at which hogs 
are sold. 
To determine the costs of the program, weekly feder-
all y inspected hog-slaughter data (35, 36) are adjusted 
to derive weekly commerical hog-slaughter estimates 
(commercial hog-slaughter data are not available by 
weeks). To derive these estimates, it is necessary to adjust 
weekly federally inspected hog slaughter as follows: 
where CSI) = commercial slaughter for ilk week of jtk 
month, 
CSJ = commercial slaughter for jlk month, 
FIS j = federally inspected slaughter for jlk month, 
and 
FISIj = federally inspected slaughter for ilk week of 
jlk month_ 
These weekly commercial hog-slaughter estimates 
are adjusted down by the percentage of sows marketed 
by weeks (32). This gives the weekly commercial bar-
raw and gilt slaughter for the United States. Chicago 
market estimates indicate that about 15 percent of the 
barrows and gilts marketed there weigh 200 pounds and 
under. This percentage is used to adjust the weekly com-
mercial barrow and gilt slaughter estimates to weekly 
commercial slaughter estimates for barrows and gilts 
weighing at or below 200 pounds. 
Under the assumption that the farmers producing 100 
percent of the hogs would participate in the program, the 
weekly commercial slaughter estimates for barrows and 
gilts weighing at or below 200 pounds are multiplied 
by the various incentive payments to obtain a total cost 
figure. Costs also are estimated for an assumed partici-
pation of those farmers producing 70 percent of the hogs. 
In a preceding section, 12 farrowing dates were chosen; 
thus, there are 12 incentive payments. The incentive 
payment would be made at the time the hogs are mar-
keted. For example, when the pigs are farrowed on Jan_ 
15, the farmers could receive payment on Aug. 15, be-
cause the hogs would weigh approximately 200 pounds at 
this time. It is assumed that this incentive payment could 
be used throughout the entire month of August. In other 
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words, there is one incentive payment for all of the Janu-
ary farrowings, all of the February farrowings, etc. 
These payments are determined in an earlier section 
for each month of the year and for a 4-year period, be-
ginning with the first farrowing date, Jan. 15, 1955, and 
ending with the last farrowing date, Dec. 15, 1958. 
When a fixed price of $16.18 per hundredweight is 
used, the payments and the total costs to the government 
are moderate (see fig. 14 and table 21). The cost of the 
program, assuming 100 percent participation, is lowest in 
1958, with a total cost of $233,213,092. The 1957 figure 
is highest, with a cost of $251,560,776. 
Why are certain years high, while others are low? 
The incentive payments for 1955 averaged $4.62 per hog. 
This is the highest average figure for any year considered; 
thus, it partially explains why the year 1955 (includes 
only 5 months) had such a high total cost. The average in-
centive payment for 1956 is lowest, with a figure of $3.35 
per hog. 
Another question might be, why does the size of pay-
ments vary? Since the price of hogs is fixed at $16.18 per 
hundredweight, the variation in the size of payments must 
be due to the variation in feed costs. In 1955, the aver· 
age corn price was only $1.24 per bushel for the last 5 
months; this is the lowest corn price for the period, ex-
cept for 1958. Meat scraps and soybean meal prices were 
comparatively high in 1955, but the fact that corn made 
up the major part of the ration explains why the incen-
tive payments are so high. In 1956, the soybean meal 
price was $4.01 per hundredweight, the meat scraps 
price was $4.73 per 100 pounds and the corn price was 
$1.42 per bushel (31). This represented the highest corn 
price, thus, lowering profits and also lowering the in-
centive payments. Soybean meal and meat scraps were 
comparatively low in price in 1956, but the incentive pay-
ments are lowest because of the high average corn price. 
The higher incentive payment in 1957 can be explained 
by a decline in corn price from $1.42 per bushel in 1956 
to $1.27 per bushel in 1957. Moreover, there was a decline 
in the price of meat scraps from $4.73 per 100 pounds 
in 1956 to $4.71 per 100 pounds in 1957 and a decline 
in the price of soybean meal from $4.01 in 1956 to $3.80 
in 1957. The incentive payments in 1958 and 1959 are 
fairly low, but not as low as those in 1956 - a differ-
ence that can be explained by the fact that the average 
prices of meat scraps were highest in 1958 and soybean 
meal prices also were comparatively high. Meat scraps 
increased most from $4.71 per 100 pounds in 1957 to 
$5.80 in 1958, while soybean meal moved from $3.80 
per 100 pounds in 1957 to $4.14 in 1958. The corn price 
was lowest this particular year; however, the very high 
Table 21. Total cost to the government of incentive-payment program 
using a fixed price of $16.18 per hundredweight, a 10· 
pound interval, and 70- and 100.percent participation for 
years 1955·59 (in dollars).-
Year 
1955b ••••••••.•••••••••••••••..•... 
1956 ............................ .. 
1957 •.••.......................... 
1958 ............................. . 
1959· ..........•..•..........•..... 
Total •............................. 
100 % participation 
142,719,587 
239,521,102 
251,560,776 
233,213.092 
150,208,397 
1.017,222,904 
Total eost 
70% participation 
99,458,687 
167,664,788 
176,086,231 
163,249,198 
105,146,870 
711,599,774 
>Total cost computed by multiplying incentive payments by adjusted 
commercial barrow and gilt slaughter. 
bIncludes only 5 months. 
<Includes only 7 months. 
Table 22. Total cos I to the government of incentive.payment program 
using actual prices, 10-paund interval, and 70- and 100-
percent participation for years 1955·59 (in dollars).' 
Year Total cost 
1955b ..•••...•.....•.•.••••••..•••.. 
1956 ............................ .. 
1957 ............................. . 
1958 ............................. . 
1959c ............................ .. 
Total ............................. . 
100 % participation 
36.586.573 
462.660,908 
483,700.435 
314,877,176 
131,505,533 
1,429.330,625 
70 % participation 
25.610,602 
323,862,675 
338,590,370 
220,411,064 
92,010,381 
1,000,485,092 
aTotal cost computed by multiplying incentive payments by adjusted 
commercial barrow and gilt slaughter. 
bIncludes only 5 months. 
cincludes only 7 months. 
soybean meal and meat scraps prices more than offset the 
lower corn price. 
There is an additional factor which determines the 
total cost - the number of hogs slaughtered in these 
years. The number of hogs slaughtered in 1955, especi-
ally during the last few months, was much higher than 
in later years. This caused the price of hogs to drop 
drastically in the last month or two of 1955. Commercial 
slaughter of barrows and gilts for the week ending Dec. 
10, 1955, was 2,027,162; for comparable weeks, it was 
1,622,741 in 1956; 1,461,667 in 1957; 1,468,763 in 1958; 
and 1,764,429 in 1959. In the first 2 or 3 months of 
1956, slaughter figures were higher than in the other 
years. For example, commercial slaughter of barrows 
and gilts for the week ending Jan. 8, 1955, was 1,555,642; 
for comparable weeks it was 1,597,895 in 1956; 1,276,682 
in 1957; 1,159,677 in 1958; and 1,164,389 in 1959. 
Similar relationships hold true for about the first 2 
months, although 1959 slaughter surpassed 1955 slaughter 
in some weeks. 
When actual prices are used to determine the total cost 
of the program, the government payments are much 
higher (refer to table 22). Even though the 1956 prices 
were low earlier in the year, they increased gradually 
throughout the remainder. of the year. This partially 
explains why the 1956 cost is comparatively high when 
actual prices are used. The prices had recovered fairly 
well by April 1956. However, the 1958 prices were even 
higher than the 1956 and 1957 prices, although the 1957 
prices were fairly high, too. Another reason for the 
comparatively high cost in 1956 is that, on the average, 
commercial barrow and gilt slaughter was greater in 1956 
than in 1957 or 1958. One reason the cost of the program 
is highest in 1957 is that feed prices declined that year, 
thus, increasing profits. 
In 1958, corn prices were lowest, declining from $1.27 
per bushel in 1957 to $1.23 per bushel in 1958, while the 
soybean meal prices were comparatively high, and meat 
scraps prices were highest. The considerable increase in 
meat scraps and soybean meal prices could have more than 
offset the lower corn price and, thus, helps to explain 
why the 1958 total cost is not so high. In addition, com· 
mercial barrow and gilt slaughter was lowest in 1958. 
Table 23. Total cost to government of incentive·payment program us· 
ing a moving.average price, 10'pound interval, and 70. and 
100'percent participation for years 1955·59 (in dollars)." 
Year Total cost 
1955 b ............................ .. 
1956 ............................. . 
1957 ............................ .. 
1958 ............................ .. 
1959" ............................. . 
Total ............................ .. 
100'70 partiCipation 
114,766.353 
328,663,820 
323,529,436 
304,967,407 
244,341,271 
1,316.268,287 
70 % participation 
80,336.453 
230.064,687 
226,472,982 
213,767,197 
171,038,879 
921.680,198 
"Total cost computed by multiplying incentive payments by adjusted 
commercial barrow and gilt slaughter. 
bIncludes only 5 months. 
<Includes only 7 month •• 
Moving.average prices could be of more value to 
the farmer as far as projecting what will happen than 
either actual prices or a fixed price. These prices are 
averaged week by week and, therefore, have a tendency 
to smooth out the price fluctuations throughout the year. 
The total costs when moving.average prices are used 
appear in table 23. In 1956, the cost is higher than in 
1957 or 1958, reflecting the fact that commercial barrow 
and gilt slaughter was higher in 1956 than it had been 
since 1952. The 1958 cost again, as when actual prices are 
used, is comparatively lower, because the prices of meat 
scraps and soybean meal made a recovery that year, 
although corn prices declined slightly. This means that, 
with moving-average prices, the profit is less during this 
year; therefore, the incentive payments have to be less 
too. 
Figure 16 shows the relationship between costs to the 
government when a fixed price of $16.18 per hundred-
weight is used, when actual prices are used and when 
moving· average prices are used. In fig. 16, it can be seen 
that, when actual prices are used, the fluctuation in total 
cost from year to year is much greater than when the 
moving-average price or fixed price is used. 
Since the assumption that the farmers producing 100 
percent of the hogs will participate in the program is 
unrealistic, it is necessary to choose some percentage to 
represent the number of hogs that might realistically be 
committed to such a program. Beneke (4) suggested that 
70 percent would be a fair estimate. 
The cost for a full 4-year period, which includes 5 
months in 1955 and 7 months in 1959, is $711,599,774 
for 70-percent participation when the $16.18 per hundred-
weight price is used. The cost for 100·percent participa-
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tion is $1,017,222,904 (refer to table 21). The cost for 
the full 4-year period, when actual prices are used with 
100·percent participation is $1,429,330,625, while it is 
$1,000,485,092 for 70'percent participation (refer to table 
22). When moving.average prices are used, the costs are 
$1,316,268,287 with 100'percent participation and $921,· 
680,198 with 70'percent participation (refer to table 23). 
The cost of the program when actual prices are used 
is extremely high, especially when 100'percent partici· 
pation is assumed. Even with 70.percent participation, 
the cost is over $1 billion for the 4-year period, a cost 
to the government of more than $250 million per year. 
Effects of the Program 
The question now remains: What would be the effects 
of such a program were it put into operation? The pro· 
gram effects in the long run would be different from those 
in the short run. 
Short-run effects 
In the short run,ll the program could reduce pork 
production substantially, and from a farmers' standpoint, 
it could also remove some of the uncertaintv connected 
with hog production. Table 24 shows an esti~ate of the 
reduction in total pork production that could have been 
possible under such a program in 1959. 
Commercial hog slaughter in the United States in 
1959 was 81,581,900 head, and federally inspected hog 
slaughter makes up about 85 percent of commercial hog 
slaughter (36). Approximately 90 percent of 1959 feder-
ally inspected hogs slaughtered was barrows and gilts 
(36). Commercial barrow and gilt slaughter. in 1959, 
therefore, is estimated by multiplying 81,581,900 times 
90 percent, which is equal to 73,423,800 head. The best 
estimate available of the average weight of barrows and 
gilts in commercial slaughter is the average weight of 
barrows and gilts at eight markets combined. For 1959, 
this was 228 pounds (36). Thus, the total pounds of pork 
from commercial barrow and gilt slaughter in 1959 is 
estimated at 16,740,605,880. 
If we assume that the average weight could have been 
reduced from 228 to, say 220 pounds by the program, 
then total pork production in 1959 could have declined 
from 16,740,605,880 pounds to 16,153,216,200 pounds, 
for a reduction of 587,389,680 pounds, or about 3.5 
percent. If we assume an average weight of 228 pounds, 
this would be equivalent to a reduction of 2,576,270 bar-
rows and gilts. 
II A. used here, short run is defined as immediate effect. within a 
production period. 
Table 24. Estimated shart·run reduction in total park produced under 
a direct·payment program designed for lightweight bar· 
rows and gilts in 1959.a 
Total hogs in commercial .laughter.......................................... 81,581,900 
Approximate percentage barrows and gilts of total 
hogs in commercial slaughter............................................ 90 
Total barrows Bnd gilt. in commercial slaughter 
(row 1 times row 2) .............................................................. 73,428,710 
Approximate average weight in pounds of barrows 
and gilts in commercial slaughter.................................... 228 
Total pounds of pork produced from barrows and gilts 
in commercial slaughter ,(row 3 times row 4).............. 16,740,605,880 
Total pound. of pork produced from barrows and gilts 
in commercial slaughter if average weight is reduced 
to 220 pounds by the program (row 3 times 220)........ 16,153,216,200 
Reduction in total pounds of pork (row 5 minus row 6).... 587,389,680 
Reduction in total barrows and gilts in commercial 
slaughter (row 7 divided by 228)...................................... 2,576.270 
aBasic data from U. S. Department of Agriculture (36). 
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Long-run effects 
Under the program, the supply of lighter hogs would 
increase relative to the supply of heavier hogs; there· 
fore, the price differential between lighter and heavier 
hogs would become smaller. This would offset part of 
the direct payments so that a new equilibrium between 
the prices of light and heavy hogs and the direct payment 
would be established, unless the incentive payments were 
made larger and larger year after year. 
The seasonal pattern of prices probably would change 
because the average weight of hogs marketed would be 
lighter, and these lighter hogs could arrive at the market 
sooner. In other words, whereas highest prices now oc· 
cur during August and September, they might be highest 
during June and July under the program. Instead of the 
price breaking in October as it does now, it might break 
in September. Lowest prices might occur in October and 
November rather than in November and December. 
If the incentive· payments program increased hog pro· 
ducers' incomes in the short run, it could induce farmers 
to produce a greater number of hogs. This increase in 
numbers could partly offset, or more than offset, the ef· 
fects of the lighter average weight. 
Table 24 indicates a reduction in 1959 pork produc· 
tion of about 3,5 percent. This would increase hog prices 
about 8.75 percent. (This is calculated by using a price 
elasticity of demand of -0.4 (29) 12 and multiplying 
3.5 times 1/0.4 = 8.75.) Where the elasticity of supply is 
less than the elasticity of demand, the cycle is converging 
and soon disappears. Where the elasticity of supply is 
greater than the elasticity of demand, the cycle is ex-
plosive and continues to grow. Empirical analysis (27, 
pp. 32.41) indicates that the elasticity of supply for hogs 
is about one until prices rise to about 30 percent above 
normal, and then it decreases to almost zero. At the point 
where elasticity of supply equals the elasticity of demand, 
the cycle would become self-perpetuating. 
Accordingly, we use the elasticity of supply of 0.4, 
which is equal to the .elasticity of demand. In response 
to the 8.75·percent increase in price, production would 
rise by 3.5 percent. (This is calculated by multiplying 
8.75 times 0,4 =3.5.) This would result in a decrease in 
price of 8.75 percent. This would bring the price back 
down to its original level. 
Eventually, a new equilibrium of total supplies and 
prices would be established. Incomes presumably would 
remain about the same as before, since no change would 
have taken place in the over-all competitive conditions 
which determine incomes. 
The new equilibrium would be attained with hogs at 
lighter weights but in larger numbers than before. Would 
this be in line with long-run consumer demands? 
If consumers demand pork from lighter weight hogs, 
does the open market transmit those demands to pro· 
ducers now? Price differentials by weights now presum-
ably reflect consumers' demands, yet the tables and charts 
on costs and returns in this bulletin indicate that an in· 
dividual farmer would make more profit in most months 
of the year by carrying hogs to heavier weights than he 
12A more recent and comprehensive report (G. E. Brandow. Inter-
relations among demands for farm products and implications for control 
of market supply. Penn. Agr. Exp. Sta. Bul. 680. p. 69. August 1961) 
puts the elasticity at --1l.4578. However, the authors considered the round 
figure of --1l.4 sufficient for the purposes of this study. 
does now. Is this a case where the short-run benefits to the 
individual producer (from carrying hogs to heavier 
weights) reduce profits for all producers as a group (be-
cause hogs are carried to heavier weights than consumers 
prefer)? Or is the present open market a reliable guide 
to increased profits for all hog producers? These ques-
tions require further research, along the lines indicated 
in a later section. 
Limitations of Investigation 
In any work of this nature, there are factors present 
which limit its scope and use. In the analysis of the pro-
gram restricting payments to lightweight hogs, one of the 
assumptions made was that the daily gain was fixed at 
1.25 pounds per day from 200 pounds upward to 300 
pounds. However, other studies have indicated that the 
daily gain is highest at weights of 180-240 pounds. The 
gain thereafter declines as the hog becomes heavier. Thus, 
to more accurately determine the return over variable 
costs of carrying hogs beyond 200 pounds, it would be 
necessary to vary the rate of gain from one weight to 
another. 
Limitations associated with determining the 
most profitable marketing weight 
The data for feed consumed per 100 pounds were 
taken from Atkinson and Klein (1). Although these data 
are more than 15 years old, the assumption was made that 
the amount of feed consumed per 100 pounds gain still 
is representative of the average consumed by hogs in the 
Corn Belt and elsewhere. The reason for believing that 
this could be a valid assumption is that experimental pigs, 
at the time the trial was being conducted, had an ad-
vantage over farm-fed pigs. These experiments were con-
ducted by experts who had college facilities at their dis-
posal. 
Menze (25) listed the following advantages that ex-
perimental pigs have over farm-fed pigs: 
(a) The experimental pigs probably are fed a better 
balanced ration than are the average pigs on farms. 
(b) The disease problem is cut down on the experi-
mental pigs because of scientific handling and, in most 
cases, more sanitary conditions. 
(c) It is quite probable that the pigs used in the ex-
periment are of a more superior quality than average 
farm pigs. 
Even though we assumed that a perfect growth chart 
could be drawn, with specified rate of gain and amount of 
feed required for every period in the life of a typical 
pig of a specified breed and type, we could not con-
fidently tell the farmer the exact time to market his hogs 
because: 
(a) It would be impossible to determine a precise mar-
ginal cost. 
(b) A number of uncertainty factors would tend to 
confuse the application of a marginal cost and marginal 
revenue analysis. Some of the uncertainties involved 
would be price and cost expectations, uncertainties of 
disease, weather conditions and ability to predict precise 
behavior of all hogs. 
(c) Other than marginal cost and marginal revenue, 
outside influences such as feed on hand and habit may 
determine time of marketing. 
Limitations associated with the determination 
of incentive payments 
Incentive payments were derived for hogs marketed 
during each month from August 1955 through July 1959. 
It was found that each month's incentive payment was 
different from year to year. Because of this variation, it 
is difficult to determine incentive payments in advance; 
e.g., setting the level of the 1963 incentive payments in 
1961. It is not known whether these payments would be 
high enough to induce farmers to market at 200 pounds or 
whether they would be too high. The size of in.centive pay-
ments needed will depend on the prices of the barrows and 
gilts at different weights, prices of feed and the amount of 
feed required to bring the hogs to various marketing 
weights. Another problem is that each individual farmer 
will be in a different situation. For one farmer the incen-
tive payment may be approximately equal to the profit he 
believes he can make by carrying his hogs to a heavier 
weight. Another farmer may find that the incentive pay-
ment is too low and so will carry his barrows and gilts to 
a heavier weight. Still another farmer may find that the 
incentive payment is higher than the profit he could 
make by carrying his hogs to a heavier weight. 
Limitations connected with determination 
of total cost 
The primary purpose of the incentive-payment pro-
gram is to reduce the total tonnage of pork coming to 
market by inducing farmers to market their hogs at lighter 
weights. The limitations associated with the determina-
tion of the size of incentive payments are: (a) The 4-year 
moving average might not fit next year's price move-
ment and the farmers' anticipated profits close enough 
to make the program effective; and (b) individual 
differences between producers in efficiency of production 
and resulting profit, as well as individual differences be-
tween hogs in feed conversion and disease resistance, 
could not be taken into account. 
Some of the administrative problems associated with 
this special kind of direct-payment program are: (a) At 
what maximum weight will hog be subsidized (190, 200, 
210 pounds, etc.)? (b) What will be done about a situ-
ation where the farmer markets his hogs a pound or two 
over the maximum marketing weight; will he be penal-
ized, receive a full payment, or no payment at all? (c) 
When should the ~ncentive payments be announced? 
In determining the total cost of the program, two of 
the things that must be known, and which cannot be 
predicted accurately, are: (a) the number of barrows 
and gilts eligible and (b) the size of the incentive pay-
ments. 
There is an additional problem in predicting the total 
cost of the program. That is the fact that it is not known 
to what extent producers would increase production; 
i.e., total number of hogs raised. One reason for increas-
ing production would be that the producer might have a 
certain amount of feed on hand; and where he previously 
used up this feed by carrying the barrows and gilts to 
heavier weights, the farmer might market them at a 
lighter weight to take advantage of the incentive-pay-
ment program. Another reason for increasing production 
is that the producer might want to have more barrows and 
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gilts on which to receive payment. It is likely that, in a 
few years, the' increase in the number of barrows and 
gilts would offset, or more than offset, the reduction of 
pork marketed because of the lighter average weight of 
hogs. 
If the number of barrows and gilts increased, pay-
ments would probably increase, and, thus, the cost of 
the program would increase. Another factor that would 
increase the cost is that the price differential between 
lighter and heavier weights would become narrower be-
cause of the incentive·payment program. That is, the price 
per pound of the lighter hogs would no longer be much 
higher than the heavier weight hogs throughout most of 
the year. This narrowing of the price differential would 
increase the size of the payment needed to induce farmers 
to market their hogs at lighter weights because the antici-
pated profits of carrying the hogs to heavier weights 
would increase. 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
It would seem that research could profitably be de-
voted to an examination of variations or combinations 
of the programs that were considered in the study. For 
example, a quota program could be used in combination 
with a program that would limit 'payments to 100 or 200 
hogs per producer. This type of program could remove 
the incentive for small-scale producers to expand pro-
duction up to the maximum number of hogs eligible for 
subsidy. Work could also be undertaken to estimate the 
cost and effects of a program that would limit payments 
to 100 or 200 barrows and gilts per producer, rather than 
to 100 or 200 hogs from any slaughter class. It may be 
possible to evaluate programs that would limit payments 
to a uniform, maximum number of hogs per producer 
more effectively when more recent census data become 
available. 
The relative cost of the quota program was quite low 
and, for this reason, may be thought to hold a consider-
able amount of promise. Work needs to be done, how-
ever, on more refined ways to estimate stable future pork 
supplies. 
Possibly the quota could be modified and established 
on the basis of historical farrowings rather than of hog 
marketings. A producer could receive direct payments for 
all hogs marketed from the farrowings of the sows eligible 
under the quota. No producer would be penalized for the 
efficient practice of raising an above.average number of 
pigs per litter. 
The estimates of the costs of the previous programs 
were determined primarily by the support prices used. 
Other support levels and methods of support need to 
be examined to obtain cost estimates under alternative 
support procedures. 
Experiments like that of the 1955 Ohio experiment 
(45), but with more hogs, would be helpful in determin-
ing the performance of hogs and the most profitable 
weight at which to market hogs, etc. Another experiment 
could be conducted at the farm level where the farmers 
would be selected at random, ranging from poor to 
good managers, from different parts of this state or in 
different parts of the Corn Belt. The farmers could be 
asked to keep an accurate check on the amount of feed fed 
to hogs, but the experiments should be conducted for a 
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long enough period so that a record of performance 
could be obtained under a variety of conditions that are 
likely to occur in different years, with different weather 
conditions and different qualities of corn, etc. 
Hogs To Be Used 
A few common breeds or types of pigs should be se-
lected and the experiment confined exclusively to them 
to eliminate the possibility of confounding results with 
differences in breeds and types of pigs. 
A sizable number of pigs should start the experiment 
in the same month and at the same age, as nearly as pos-
sible. Atkinson and Klein (1, p. 5) based their work on 
information obtained from 813 pigs in five experiments 
in the Corn Belt; however, the Ohio experiment included 
only 10 hogs (45). The pigs should be carried to at least 
300 pounds and perhaps more, until it was shown defin· 
itely that it was unprofitable to do so under all circum-
stances. 
Ration To Be Used 
The ration should be of high quality and comparable 
to those used in current efficient operations. The results 
should be recorded weekly to obtain precision. 
Determine Total Cost in the Future 
Estimation of total cost of the incentive· payment pro· 
gram for future years should be made. This would require 
an estimate of total marketings and an estimate of the 
percentage of barrows and gilts marketed under the 
maximum weight limit that could be set by the govern-
ment. The estimation of total marketings would require 
some knowledge of the percentage of farmers participat-
ing in a program of this type. Some knowledge of the 
probable increase in the number of hogs produced in 
the first and in subsequent years also would be required. 
If the increase in the number of hogs produced is fairly 
large, and if a fairly large number of farmers participate 
in the program, some adjustments in the incentive pay-
ments determined in this study might need to be made. 
This would be especially true if an experiment similar 
to the one suggested were conducted and if the results 
showed the performance of the hogs to be significantly 
different from that for hogs used in the present study. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The chief objective of the direct-payment programs 
considered in this report is to increase hog producers' in-
comes by reducing the total supply of pork. The analyses 
of several different programs lead to these conclusions: 
1. A program that would limit payments to 100 or 
200 hogs per producer. 
Assuming a direct payment of $2 per 100 pounds, the 
cost in 1954 (the latest year for which census data are 
available) of a program limiting payments to 100 hogs 
per producer would have been about 229 million dollars. 
If the limit had been set at ·200 hogs per producer, the 
cost would have been about 268 million dollars, and, if 
no limit had been set, the cost would have been about 
286 million dollars. In all three cases, the programs 
would have increased hog producers' incomes by the same 
amount. 
Under this kind of program, small producers would 
be inclined to increase their production toward the num-
ber of hogs eligible for payments, while large producers, 
anticipating lower prices for that reason, would be in-
clined to reduce their production. It is difficult to esti-
mate what the net effect on production would be. 
2. A program to restrict payments to a national quota 
distributed pro rata among hog producers. 
This type of program would have effects proportional 
to the size of the quota. Using quotas based on the esti-
mated pork supplies for 1959 and apportioned on the 
basis of historical marketings, the cost of payments for 
1959 would have been about 110 million dollars. The 
payment procedure used in the calculations is similar to 
that used in the Canadian program. The support price 
used is 80 percent of the United States average price of 
hogs for the 10-year period from 1949 through 1958, or 
$14.70 per hundredweight. The estimated weighted aver-
age price of hogs in the United States in 1959 is $14.07 
per hundredweight. Therefore, payments are figured at 
63 cents per hundredweight for all hogs sold under 
quotas. 
The quota calculated for 1959 is ] 2 percent less than 
actual marketings. Using an estimate of elasticity of de-
mand for hogs at the farm level of -0.4, the value of 
the smaller quota marketings is about 11 percent greater 
than the actual value of hog marketings during 1959. 
This increase in hog producers' incomes would have come 
from consumers in the higher prices they would pay for 
less pork and in the additional cost of other foods they 
would buy instead of pork. The long-run effects would 
depend, of course, upon how well the quota restrictions 
could be enforced. 
3. A program to restrict payments to lightweight hogs. 
If this program induced all farmers to sell their bar-
rows and gilts at or below 200 pounds, the total tonnage of 
barrows and gilts would be reduced by about 15 percent. 
This would increase the total value by about the same per-
centage. 
But it is unlikely that the payments could be large 
enough to induce all farmers to participate, and the in-
crease in the market supplies of lightweight hogs would 
depress their prices relative to the prices of heavy hogs. 
That would offset part or all of the payment. Accordingly, 
it is difficult to estimate benefits and costs for this pro-
gram accurately. It seems likely, however, that the end 
result would be more hogs, at lighter weights, with 
total hog returns about the same as they were before the 
program, since no change would have taken place in the 
over-all competitive conditions that determine total re-
turns. 
It has also been demonstrated in this study that a 
change in the price of hogs exerts a distinct influence on 
the profitable weight to which hogs should be fed. In 
addition, it has been demonstrated that feed prices have 
an effect on the weight to which a farmer can carry his 
hogs to maXImIze the profits he can make on his hog 
enterprise. Remember, however, that the optimurq,market-
ing weights calculated in this study for prior years are 
those at which an 'individual producer could have maxi-
mized his returns. If all producers had marketed at these 
optimum weights, then the price-supply relationship 
would have changed and, with it, the optimum marketing 
weights. 
Seasonality in prices and costs has been shown to be 
of utmost importance in the determination of the weight 
at which to market hogs most profitably. Some of the 
conclusions drawn from the present study on seasonality 
follow: 
(a) For the period, 1947·59, highest prices occur 
during June, July and August, with September prices de-
clining only slightly. The prices break in October and 
reach a low point in November or December. Prices 
gradually rise from January through July. During the 
period 1930·41, however, Atkinson and Klein (1) found 
that prices showed a late winter peak and an early spring 
decline. The later winter peak and early spring decline 
have been eliminated in more recent years. Thus, the sea-
sonality of prices has changed over the years. 
(b) Data on how heavy to feed the hogs in different 
time periods during the year also are useful to farmers. 
For example, for the years 1955·59 when a moving-aver-
age price was used, it was profitable to carry the hogs 
to 210 pounds when the farrowing date was Feb. 15, but 
it was profitable to carry the hogs to 285 pounds when 
the farrowing date was Sept. 15. 
(c) Pigs farrowed in February and March could 
be marketed more favorably at lighter weights than at 
heavier weights. For pigs farrowed in April (the peak 
spring farrowing month), not much of a price discount 
is noted for heavier weights, whereas May and June pigs 
bring higher prices at 240 and 270 pounds. July pigs 
can usually be carried to heavier weights, and so can 
October pigs. But November pigs farrowed early in the 
month show an advantage at 240 pounds over the 270-
pound weight. For pigs farrowed later in November, the 
270-pound pigs have the profitability advantage over the 
240-pound pigs. 
(d) Price differentials for hogs at different weights 
proved to be quite important in the present study. Re-
sults indicate that this factor alone could determine 
whether or not it was profitable to carry barrows and gilts 
to heavier weights. The price differential became of minor 
importance in some periods because the demand for 
heavier hogs narrowed the price differential. The pro-
ducer should take this factor into account in planning 
the hog program on his farm. 
Prices of feed generally declined toward the end of 
the year and, thus, caused the incentive payments to be 
somewhat higher than they would have been had the 
feed prices been stable. In general, however, the differ-
ence in prices of feed from time to time was relatively 
small and, therefore, had a much smaller effect than 
did changes in hog prices. 
825 
LITERATURE CITED 
1. Atkinson, L. Jay and J. W. Klein. Feed consumption 
and marketing weight of hogs. U.S. Dept. Agr. Tech. 
Bul. 894. 1945. 
2. Baird. F. F. Canada Dept. Agr., Ottawa, Ontario, 
Canada. Information on Canadian deficiency pay-
ment program. (Private communication.) 1960. 
3. Bauman, R. H. and L. Eisgruber. Moderately large 
hog enterprises again pay best. Dept. Agr. Econ., 
Purdue University, Lafayette, Ind. April 30, 1960. 
4. Beneke, R. R. Department of Economics and Sociol-
ogy, Iowa State University of Science and Technol-
ogy, Ames, Iowa. Information on interest on invest-
ment in hog production, risk of loss for hogs beyond 
200 pounds and participation of farmers in the in-
centive-payment program. (Private communication.) 
1960. 
5. Breimyer, H. F. and Charlotte A. Kause. Charting the 
seasonal market for meat animals. U.S. Dept. Agr., 
Agr. Handbook No. 83. 1955. 
6. Canada Agricultural Stabilization Board. Annual 
Report. 1958·59. 
7. . Annual Report, 1959·60. 
8. Canada Dept. Agr., Economics Division. Current Re· 
view of Agricultural Conditions in Canada. 20, No.6. 
Nov. 1959. 
9. . Economics Division, Current Review 
of Agricultural Conditions in Canada. 21, No. 1. Jan. 
1960. 
10. . Economics Division. Current Review 
of Agricultural Conditions in Canada. 21, No.2. 
March 1960. 
n. . Economics Division. Current Review 
of Agricultural Conditions in Canada. 21, No.3. May 
1960. 
12. . Economics Division. Current Heview 
of Agricultural Conditions in Canada. 21, No.5. 
Sept. 1960. 
13. . Information Division. Farm News. No. 
947. Nov. 5, 1958. 
14. . Information Division. Farm News. No. 
960. May 20,1959. 
15. . Information Division. Farm News. No. 
974. Dec. 16, 1959. 
16. . Information Division. Farm News. No. 
981. April 6, 1960. 
17. . Information Division. Farm News. No. 
931. March 5, 1958. 
18. . Markets Information Section. Produc-
tion and Marketing Branch. Livestock Market Re· 
view, 1959. 1960. 
19. Engelman, Gerald, Austin A. Dowell, Evan F. Ferrin 
and Phillip A. Anderson. Marketing slaughter hogs 
by carcass weight and grade. Minn. Agr. Exp. Sta. 
Tech. Bul. 187. 1950. 
20. Foote, R. J. and Karl A. Fox. Seasonal variation 
methods of measurement and tests of significance. 
U.S. Dept. Agr., Agr. Handbook No. 48.1952. 
826 
21. Fuller, W. A., Glen Purnell, Lonnie Fielder, Marvin 
Laursen, Ray Beneke and Geoffrey Shepherd. An al-
ternative parity formula for agriculture. Iowa Agr. 
and Home Econ. Exp. Sta. Res. Bul. 476. 1960. 
22. Harkness, Douglas S. Address by the Honorable 
Douglas S. Harkness, Canada Minister of Agricul-
ture, to the twenty·second annual meeting of the Na-
tional Farm Institute, Des Moines, Iowa, Saturday, 
Feb. 20, 1960. (Mimeo.) Canada Dept. Agr., Ottawa, 
Ontario, Canada. 1960. 
23. Kidd, J. D. F. Canada Dept. Agr., Ottawa, Ontario, 
Canada. Information on Canadian deficiency pay-
ment program. (Private communication.) 1960. 
24. Maki, Wilbur. Department of Economics and Sociol-
ogy, Iowa State University of Science and Technol-
ogy, Ames, Iowa. Postwar demand elasticity estimates 
for hogs. (Private communication.) 1959. 
25. Menze, Robert A. Application of the law of dimin-
ishing returns to the production of hogs. Unpub-
lished M.S. thesis .. Iowa State University Library, 
Ames, Iowa. 1941. 
26. Rackham, T. S. Department of Economics and Soci-
ology, Iowa State University of Science and Technol-
ogy, Ames, Iowa. Information on Canadian deficiency 
payment program. (Private communication.) 1960. 
27. Shepherd, Geoffrey S. Agricultural price analysis. 
4th ed. Iowa State University Press, Ames, Iowa. 
1957. 
28. , Don Kaldor and Francis Kutish. Let's 
think about hog supplies and prices. Iowa Farm 
Science. 13, No. 12:3-6. June 1959. 
29. .Arnold Paulson, Francis Kutish, Don 
Kaldor, Richard Heifner and Gene Futrell. Produc-
tion, price and income estimates and projections for 
the feed-livestock economy under specified control 
and market sharing conditions. Iowa Agr. and Horne 
Econ. Exp. Sta. Spec. Rep. 27. 1960. 
30. Speer, Vaughn C. Department of Animal Husbandry, 
Iowa State University of Science and Technology, 
Ames, Iowa. Risk of loss of hogs beyond 200 pounds. 
(Private communication.) 1960. 
31. U.S. Dept. Agr. Agricultural Marketing Service. 
Grain and feed statistics, 1957-59. U.S. Dept. Agr. 
Stat. Bul. 159. 1958; Bul. 159, Supplement for 
1958. 1959; Bul. 159, Supplement for 1959. 1960. 
32. . Agricultural Marketing Service. Live-
stock Division. Market News. Vols. 17 through 27. 
1949 through 1959. 
33. . Agricultural Marketing Service. Live-
stock Division. Market News. Vols. 24 through 27. 
1956 through 1959. 
34. . Agricultural Marketing Service. Live-
stock and Meat Situation. No. LMS·I03. July 1959. 
35. . Agricultural Marketing Service. Live· 
stock and Meat Statistics, 1957. U.S. Dept. of Agr. 
Stat. Bul. 230. 1958. 
36. . Agricultural Marketing Service. Supple· 
ment for 1959 to Livestock and Meat Statistics. Sup. 
plement for 1959 to U.S. Dept. Agr. Stat. Bul. 230. 
1960. 
37. . Agricultural Marketing Service, Wash· 
ington, D.C. Price data for barrows and gilts at Chi· 
cago. (Pl-ivate communication.) 1960. 
38. . Agricultural Marketing Service. Wool 
Situation. No. TWS·45. Oct. 1958. 
39. . Agrictultural Statistics. Vols. 1948 
through 1954. 
40. . Agricultural Statistics. Vol. 1955. 
41. . Agricultural Statistics. Vol. 1956. 
42. . Agricultural Statistics. Vols. 1957 
through 1958. 
43. U.S. Dept. Comm. U.S. Bureau of the Census. Cur· 
rent Population Reports. Ser. P·25, No. 218. Aug. 1, 
1960. 
44. . U.S. Bureau of the Census. U.S. Census 
of Agriculture, 1954. Vol. 2: General Report. United 
States Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
1956. 
45. Wilson, R. F. and A. W. Jordan. Costs of feeding to 
heavier weights. National Hog Farmer 4, No. 6:38. 
Sept. 1959. 
827 
